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ABSTRACT 
 During major hurricanes, key roads and facilities for military missions can 
become disrupted and unreachable. This is compounded with local evacuation orders that 
require nearby communities and military personnel to quickly leave the area. Yet, many 
military installations and municipalities do not coordinate their evacuation plans, leading 
to major traffic jams that further disrupt operations on and off base. In this work, we 
develop a mathematical model and a robust data set of roads, at-risk populations, and 
evacuation destinations to analyze optimal evacuation for Naval Station (NAVSTA) 
Newport and surrounding communities on Aquidneck Island. Our work informs possible 
prioritization of evacuation for all at-risk populations—civilian and military—and 
identifies critical infrastructure that can assist in minimizing the total evacuation 
clearance time for Aquidneck Island. Analysis in this thesis was used to advise 
emergency operations at NAVSTA Newport prior to landfall of Hurricane Henri in New 
England in August 2021. 
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Executive Summary
Evacuation is the withdrawal or removal of people from endangered areas. Successful and
timely evacuation during a disaster is a complex problem, one in which transportation
infrastructure plays a significant role. Unfortunately, past disasters, both natural and man-
made, have highlighted serious shortcomings in current emergency transportation planning
and management. Hurricanes that make landfall in the northeastern United States tend to
cause more devastation than their southern counterparts because as they track up the East
Coast they increase in wind and storm surge. While there are many East Coast communities
that are impacted by hurricanes, we focus our analysis on Aquidneck Island, the largest
island in Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island, composed of 38 square miles, a population of
around 60,000 and an average elevation of only 46 feet above sea level. On Aquidneck Island
resides the city of Newport, the municipalities ofMiddletown and Portsmouth, as well Naval
Station (NAVSTA) Newport. Across these civilian and military communities, evacuation
plans are not coordinated in terms of who should evacuate first, where they should go and
by what route, all of which ultimately places a substantial portion of the island’s population
at considerable risk.
This thesis focuses on the capacity of Aquidneck Island transportation infrastructure system
and its ability to handle the mass departures of its at-risk populations even when faced
with the uncertainty surrounding the precise location and potential no-notice of hurricanes.
We define the critical components of this transportation system as the at-risk populations
that reside in flood and hurricane evacuation zones, the roads and bridges that facilitate
movement across the island and to the mainland, as well as designated mass evacuation
shelters and off-island evacuation points. Our goal is to use a time-phased network flow
model that will produce recommendations for Aquidneck Island’s emergency planners on
how to improve their emergency evacuation plans over the course of an evacuation period
when faced with mass evacuation problems from the city of Newport, municipalities of
Portsmouth and Middletown, as well as NAVSTA Newport and her tenant commands.
We achieve this by performing the following modeling and analysis tasks:
1. Data Processing, Curation and Network Construction. We construct a data set that
xv
is useful in the analysis of at-risk population evacuation over the surface roads and
bridges for Aquidneck Island.
2. Model Formulation. We develop a transportation modeling process that measures
optimal evacuation clearance times for specific at-risk populations evacuating to
assigned inland mass evacuation shelters or off-island.
3. Evacuation Modeling Analysis. Using our data set and optimization model, we deter-
mine the capability of Aquidneck Island’s road and evacuation facility infrastructure
systems to enable timely evacuation of all at-risk populations. By doing so, we also
identify which city or municipality has the greatest difficulty evacuating its coastal
communities.
We consider three evacuation scenarios: Scenario 1 models current evacuation plans, Sce-
nario 2 examines Hurricane Henri, which struck NewEngland in August 2021, and Scenario
3 considers increased shelter capacities. Results for each scenario answer several key ques-
tions.
First, what is the optimal clearance time of populations from each installation, city, and
township on Aquidneck Island under current evacuation plans?Wemodel Scenario 1 based
on the current restrictions and plans provided by the city of Newport, and municipalities of
Middletown, and Portsmouth as well as NAVSTA Newport. This baseline scenario results
in a total evacuation clearance time of 15 hours, with the city of Newport and NAVSTA
Newport resulting in the longest clearance times within their communities.
Second, what is the optimal clearance time of populations if an evacuation route is re-
stricted from use? Additionally, which communities are the most impacted due to increased
evacuation restrictions?Wemodel the closure of the Newport Bridge restricting evacuation
westward as well as requiring all military personnel to evacuate off-island. This results in
an increased clearance time of 30 hours for the entire island, with NAVSTA Newport’s
clearance time increasing to 19 hours and the city of Newport’s clearance time doubling to
30 hours.
Third, if on-island shelter capacities can be increased, what is the resulting optimal clear-
ance time and which shelter allows for the greatest intake of evacuating vehicles? Increasing
capacity of the on-island shelters allows for more evacuees to remain on-island versus evac-
uating off-island. Here, we did not see a change in overall clearance time, which remained
xvi
at 15 hours. The two shelters that were determined to be the most beneficial due to the
raised capacities were the Florence Grey Shelter in the City of Newport and Portsmouth
High School.
Overall, the model formulation and data set requirements are very flexible and can be easily
reproduced to analyze the effects of flooding and storm surge inundation from hurricanes
on various other military installations and at-risk communities.
This work was performed in collaboration with the Military Installation Resilience Review
(MIRR) in Newport led by the University of Rhode Island.
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Evacuation is the withdrawal or removal of people from endangered areas. Successful and
timely evacuation during a disaster is a complex problem, one in which transportation
infrastructure plays a significant role. Unfortunately, past disasters, both natural and man-
made, have highlighted serious shortcomings in current emergency transportation planning
and management. Emergency plans based on inadequate representations of a community’s
transportation network or executed poorly put at risk a significant number of lives. For this
reason, development of evacuation models that accurately reflect a community’s unique
requirements is needed for comprehensive emergency plans. Every year the United States
is impacted by a variety of storms, with an increasing number of them declared as major
disasters by the president. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the
organization responsible for tracking and reporting on these disasters, which average an-
nually in number between 40 to 80 across the United States (Skinner Jr et al. 2009). Due
to such a high number of natural disasters, emergency management planning regarding the
evacuation of people to or from critical locations remains of vital interest to homeland
security and national defense.
1.1 Thesis Goals
This thesis focuses on the capacity of an urbanized transportation infrastructure system
and its ability to handle the mass departures of its inhabitants even when faced with the
uncertainty surrounding the precise location and potential no-notice of incidents. A time-
phased network flow model enables the analysis of this type of transportation problem by
producing recommendations for city planners on how to improve their emergency evacuation
plans over the course of an evacuation period (Yuhas 2011; Malveo 2013). In this work, we
develop suitable models and analysis for Naval Station Newport (NAVSTA), nearby military
and coast guard installations, the city of Newport, and the townships of Middletown and
Portsmouth located on Aquidneck Island in Rhode Island. Due to the recent volatile nature
of storms that have impacted the Eastern coast of the United States, we seek to develop
optimal evacuation plans given future storms and infrastructure impacts based on novel
1
hurricane simulations and consequence models. Specifically, the purpose of this thesis is to
address the following questions:
1. What is the optimal clearance time of populations from each installation, city, and
township on Aquidneck Island given future storms?
2. How should current evacuation plans change to accommodate future evacuation
needs?
3. Is there critical infrastructure or specific capacity constraints that directly impact
evacuation clearance time?
1.2 Background
The 2020 Atlantic hurricane season, which stretched frommid-May to early December, was
a season of extreme events; it witnessed the most named storms in a year, the most storms
that made landfall in the continental United States, and the most storms to form during the
month of September, which is historically the most active month of the Atlantic hurricane
season. Even though hurricanes and tropical storms form in both the Atlantic and Pacific
Basin, the storms that form in the Pacific basin rarely make landfall. In contrast, nearly
every mile of the eastern seaboard experienced high winds and storm surge at some point
during 2020. Hurricanes that make landfall in the Northeast tend to cause more devastation
than their more southern counterparts because as they track up the east coast they increase
in wind and storm surge. When combined with the absence of protected beaches, increased
coastal erosion, and high coastal populations of New England, this is the perfect recipe for
catastrophe.
Rhode Island, located within the New England region and known for its sandy beaches and
historic coastal towns, has a geography that makes it vulnerable to hurricanes and flooding
disasters. Rhode Island is only 40 miles wide but has over 400 miles of coastline due to
the Narragansett Bay and other inlets (Lemons 2021). In addition to such a vast coastline,
the majority of the state’s land mass is only 200 feet above sea level, of which 47 square
miles (12%) lie within 4.9 vertical feet of sea level, and an additional 24 square miles
(6%) between 4.9 and 11.4 feet above sea level (Climate Change Collaborative 2021). This
geography makes Rhode Island susceptible to multiple types of coastal and inland flooding,
whether from riverine overflow, surface flooding, storm surge, or rising sea levels as a result
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of climate change.
Statewide vulnerability to hurricanes and flooding means a significant amount of Rhode
Island’s commercial and public transportation infrastructure is also susceptible to these
disasters. Rhode Island relies on a transportation network consisting of over 6,000 miles of
public roads and highways to support its local economy. Many Rhode Island communities
rely on tourism, agriculture, and coastal-dependent industries. For example, Rhode Island
hosted 26.2 million visitors and generated $1.7 billion in tax revenues in 2019 (Tourism
Economics 2019). With the majority of Rhode Island’s topography sitting barely above sea
level, a storm surge of just one percent has the potential to flood 337 miles of public roads
(Morrison et al. 2020). With climate change comes the continued rise in sea level. That
same one percent storm surge combined with a seven-foot rise in sea level would flood 573
miles of Rhode Island roads and 163 bridges (Morrison et al. 2020). The combined threat
of flooding from storm surge and sea level rise places Rhode Island’s coastal transportation
systems at a much higher risk of blockage and washout than those further inland.
The risk of storm surge and sea level rise also threatens military installations and federal
infrastructure located on the coast of Rhode Island. NAVSTA Newport—located on the
West coast of Aquidneck Island in Rhode Island (Figure 1.1) is the Navy’s foremost site for
training for both officer and enlisted communities as well as the main testing site of various
advanced undersea warfare and development systems. Attached to NAVSTANewport are 50
Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve commands and activities whose
populations account for approximately 1,000 permanently assigned military members as
well as 1,700 students on any given day (MilitaryBases.US 2021).
Sustaining operations on board NAVSTA Newport during storm events as well as with-
standing future challenges from sea level rise depend on critical infrastructure both on the
installation and within the surrounding municipalities. The critical infrastructure systems
that support the continued operations within this installation, such as energy, water, and
emergency services, are all located within the surrounding city of Newport as well as the
nearby townships of Middletown and Portsmouth. Although each of these municipalities
have individual emergency response plans, there is no holistic emergency or hazard miti-
gation plan between them. In particular, flooding of federal and local roadways can impact
military missions by preventing access to facilities at NAVSTANewport and slowing supply
3
chains required for training and research missions.
Figure 1.1. Rhode Island, Aquidneck Island and NAVSTA Newport. State of
Rhode Island and zoomed in location of Aquidneck Island, which contains
the city of Newport and townships of Portsmouth and Middletown as well
as NAVSTA Newport. Adapted from Newport Rhode Island (2020).
1.3 Hurricanes in Rhode Island
Hurricanes are complex phenomena that cause a combination of extremewinds, rainfall, and
storm surge. Rhode Island has experienced several hurricane-driven disasters that inform
future community andmilitary evacuation plans. Notwithstanding the impacts of highwinds
on buildings and infrastructure, we describe the impacts of extreme rainfall and storm surge
to guide evacuation planning.
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1.3.1 Past Hurricane Disasters
“The Great New England hurricane of 1938 was one of the most powerful and destructive
storms to strike southern New England” (University of Rhode Island 2021). Developing
near Cape Verde, this storm tracked for 12 days up the Atlantic coast and made landfall
on Long Island on 12 September during a period of high tide (University of Rhode Island
2021). The hurricane maintained its center over the warm gulf stream, sustaining winds of
over 100 mile per hour (MPH). Even though Rhode Island escaped most of the rainfall, it
experienced the devastation and power of the storm surge. Narragansett Bay experienced
12-to-15 foot waves that destroyed most of the coastal homes, flooded the marinas, blocked
roads, and covered Providence in 20 feet of water before continuing inland. In the aftermath
of the hurricane, the coastal communities of Rhode Island were devastated with over 8,900
homes and buildings destroyed and 564 lives lost (University of Rhode Island 2021).
Twenty years later in 1954, Hurricane Carol made landfall over Rhode Island, bringing
with it sustained winds of 100 mph and the strongest ever recorded wind gusts of 135 MPH
(Hurricane Science 2021). Narragansett Bay once again experienced storm surges between
10 to 15 feet, but since Carol made landfall just after high tide, the overall storm tide was
lower as it approached inland, and high flood areas like Providence experienced lesser but
still devastating flooding of 12 feet. Unlike the Great New England hurricane, Rhode Island
experienced more rainfall, but coastal flooding was still the most catastrophic, destroying
4,000 homes. Cascading failures within the power grid also caused the loss of power across
the entire state (Hurricane Science 2021).
Just a year later, two storms, Connie and Diane, passed over New England within one week
of each other. These storms, unlike those previously mentioned, did not exhibit the same
velocity of winds, but instead brought large amounts of rain that caused excessive freshwater
flooding across Connecticut and Rhode Island. Record flooding of the Blackstone River in
Massachusetts pushed floodwater into the Blackstone River Valley in Rhode Island. Under
excessive pressure, the dam north of Woonsocket broke, releasing a 20-foot wall of water
down the river. This caused the river to crest 12.8 feet above the tide gauge and spill into
Woonsocket (University of Rhode Island, Graduate School of Oceanography 2021). These
storms caused devastating floodwaters that spread across Rhode Island before dumping into
the Narragansett Bay. The cascading impacts from these storm events still mark the worst
flooding in Rhode Island’s history.
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In 2010, another series of heavy rainstorms over a five-week period saturated much of the
soils around Rhode Island’s rivers. Unable to properly drain, excessive rainfall brought a
majority of the rivers and streams to water levels above their flood gauge, and they crested
at heights that broke many of the records set during the Great New England flood of
1938. The waste treatment facility in Warwick Rhode Island was inundated with water
and subsequently spilled wastewater into the surrounding region. The state’s transportation
infrastructure system came to a halt as Interstate 95 in Cranston, a connector airport, railroad
tracks in Westerly, and roads all across the state were flooded. More importantly, loss of
transportation infrastructure was responsible for the isolation of many of the population
centers across Rhode Island.
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy was the deadliest, strongest, and most devastating hurri-
cane of that year, ripping through eight countries all the way from the Caribbean to Canada,
including the entire eastern seaboard of the United States. Although downgraded to a Cate-
gory 2 hurricane by the time it hit Rhode Island, Hurricane Sandy has remained as the largest
Atlantic hurricane on record with tropical storm strength winds stretching over 900 miles
(Rafferty 2012). What Hurricane Sandy lacked in intensity she made up with in duration. A
low-pressure system off the coast of New England combined with a high-pressure system
moving south from Canada prevented Hurricane Sandy from moving quickly back out to
sea. Multiple tide cycles combined with Sandy’s strong winds created 15- to 30-foot seas
that pounded Rhode Island’s coast, decimating the protective 6- to 10-foot sand dunes, and
inundating many of the state’s coastal flood zones with a storm tide that was greater than
9.5 feet (Schubert et al. 2015).
In August 2021, just weeks before the completion of this thesis, Hurricane Henri was the
first tropical cyclone to make landfall in Rhode Island in 20 years. The storm resulted in less
damage than initially forecast but dropped large amounts of rain that resulted in prolonged
flooding and electrical outages (Newman 2021).
1.3.2 Flooding Caused by Hurricanes
Understanding how hurricanes impact communities and evacuation plans requires knowl-
edge of the different kinds of flooding hurricanes cause in Rhode Island. There are three
common types of episodic flooding—fluvial, pluvial, and coastal flooding—that cause inun-
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dation of the surrounding land. Each type is formed differently and subsequently produces
different types and levels of damage and impacts. As a result of permanent sea level rise
and increased storm occurrences, all three of these types of flooding have become more
persistent across the New England region.
Fluvial floods are river floods, where water levels in a lake, river or stream rise over their
banks andflowonto the surrounding terrain. There is ameasurable difference betweenfluvial
flooding events and pluvial (rainfall) events in terms of duration as fluvial events “usually
occur for duration of days, or even weeks with widespread damages in the floodplains of
river systems” (Patra et al. 2016). This excessive rise in water levels is typically caused
by heavy, consistent rainstorms or large snow melts. The intensity of the flood is highly
dependent on the volume and velocity of the rainfall as well as the size of the corresponding
watershed. In flatter regions, water can spill over the banks and remain for long periods of
time due to lack of drainage; in more mountainous regions, water can drain very quickly,
flooding the areas downhill with large amounts of fast-moving water that is carrying large
amounts of debris, causing extensive damage in its wake.
Pluvial floods, either surface water floods or flash floods, are formed after excessive rainfall
and are not specifically linked to the overflow of any body of water. This type of flooding
“occurs when the rainfall rate exceeds the capacity of storm water drains to evacuate the
water and the capacity of the ground to absorb water” (Houston et al. 2011). What makes
this type of flooding dangerous is that it can occur anywhere, urban or rural areas, coastal
or inland. Surface water floods are those caused when an independent system such as an
urban water or sewage system becomes overwhelmed and spills onto the surrounding areas.
This type of flooding typically has slow buildup, and when flooding occurs it is slow and
shallow. Surface flooding is more of a nuisance, creating temporary blockage of roadways
and intersections versus large-scale property damage or loss of life. Flash floods are another
type of pluvial floods. This flooding occurs with little warning and is a high-velocity deluge
of water caused by excessive rainfall in a short period of time. These types of floods are
very dangerous and can lead to fatalities in addition to extensive damage of the surrounding
areas because they occur with little warning, begin in areas of higher terrain, and inundate
lower areas with a high flow rate of water.
Coastal flooding is inundation of the shoreline and the surrounding coastal region due to
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low- pressure weather systems that form in the ocean, drawing intensity from the warm
water and causing the highest level of water surge when they make landfall during periods
of high tide. The severity of the storm surge depends on the level of the tide when the storm
encroaches the shore in combination with the size, speed, strength, and direction of the
storm itself. The surrounding region’s topography is also a factor in the level of potential
destruction. While natural formations like sand dunes, wetlands, levees, and barrier islands
in addition to man-made structures can help reduce the impact of the storm surge, they
can also amplify the effects. Levees can break, natural formations can inadvertently create
a tunneling effect that channels and intensifies storm destruction, and these combinations
combined with high winds and destruction of residences and buildings can lead to very
deadly situations.
FEMA has implemented a Risk Mapping Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP) program
that works with communities in Rhode Island and across the United States to assess flood
risks. The basis of the calculations for determining this floodwater risk is utilization of Base
Flood Elevation (BFE). The BFE is the “expected elevation that floodwater will rise during
a flooding event that has a 1% chance of occurring”, also otherwise known as the 100-year
flood (FEMA 2020). FEMA has formulated Special Flood Hazard Areas, which are those
areas that are inundated during these surface water floods. Information regarding each zone
can be found in Table 1.1.
Further detail on the assignment of these zones across Rhode Island is depicted in Table 1.2.
Due to its small size, Rhode Island has only five counties, although there is no active
government at that level. Even though Newport County contains the smallest amount of
floodplains, totaling just 6%, it does however, contain the largest coastal area, totaling 23%,
that is subject to a velocity hazard (wave action).
There is not a single community within Rhode Island that is not vulnerable to some type
of flooding, and based on historical events, this state will likely continue to experience
one to five flooding events per year. Table 1.3 depicts the number of flooding events that
have occurred between 1996 and 2018 (Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency
2018). The cities and townships analyzed in our research reside in Newport County, which
according to the figure, has experienced 0.87 annualized flooding events over this period of
time. This value can provide a reference that is valuable in predicting the number of future
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Table 1.1. FEMA Flood Zones. Description of FEMA flood zones on Aquid-
neck Island. Adapted from Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency
(2013).
Zone Risk Type Description
A high Areas subject to inundation by the 1% annual-chance
flood event generally determined using approximate methodologies.
AE high Areas subject to inundation by the 1% annual-chance
flood event determined by detailed methods.
AO high Areas subject to inundation by the 1% annual-chance
shallow flooding (usually sheet flow) where average depths are between 1-3 ft.
AH high Areas subject to inundation by the 1% annual-chance
shallow flooding (usually areas of ponding) where average depths are between 1-3 ft.
VE high Coastal areas subject to inundation by the 1% annual-chance flood event
coastal with additional hazards due to storm-induced velocity wave action.
Table 1.2. Rhode Island Flood Zones by County. Adapted from Rhode Island




County Zone A Zone AE Zone AO Zone AH Zone VE change Levee
Name (sq. mile ) (sq. mile) (sq. mile) (sq. mile) (sq. mile) area (sq. mile)
(sq. mile)
Bristol 0.080 7.614 0.002 0.000 3.872 3.205 0.000
Kent 6.520 8.255 0.007 0.000 4.066 3.161 0.024
Newport 1.817 5.827 0.000 0.000 23.525 4.289 0.000
Providence 24.853 13.300 0.000 0.008 2.525 5.985 0.652
Washington 30.463 20.673 0.000 0.000 21.205 10.002 0.000
events for this region; however, it does not consider sea level rise or climate change, which
undoubtedly will cause this annualized value to increase in years to come.
1.3.3 Impacts of Climate Change
In addition to the damage caused by past events, future storms are expected to have even
greater impacts in Rhode Island. Climate change is having an impact on both episodic and
persistent flooding. Episodic flooding events are intermittent occurrences of short duration
such as storm surge and riverine overflow that can be forecasted to some degree. Analyzing
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Table 1.3. Rhode Island Flooding Events 1996-2018. Adapted from Rhode
Island Emergency Management Agency (2018).
County Number of Annualized Property Annualized
Name Events Events Damages Damages
Bristol 25 1.09 $6,5234,000 $271,043.48
Kent 49 2.13 $27,872,000 $1,211,826.09
Newport 20 0.07 $6,635,000 $288,478.26
Providence 99 4.3 $32,580,000 $1,416,521.73
Washington 36 1.57 $33,427,000 $1,453,347.83
historic weather patterns and the utilization of advanced storm modeling techniques help
identify and track the formation of weather systems that have the potential of impacting the
eastern seaboard. However, in conjunction with the rising ocean temperatures, the duration
of hurricane seasons is lengthening, and various types of weather systems are concurrently
increasing in frequency and intensity. Additionally, a well-accepted consequence to climate
change is that sea levels are a continuing to rise, with the average global sea level increasing
approximately 8-to-9 inches since 1880 (Lindsay 2021). Sea level in North Eastern United
States is in fact rising at a higher rate than the global averagewith states such as Rhode Island
expected to experience a sea level rise of 9.6 feet by 2100 (Coastal Research Management
Council 2017).
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has conducted multiple
studies in order to better identify areas of the U.S. coastline that are the most impacted
during varying sea level rise scenarios. These studies in conjunction with STORMTOOLS,
“a Rhode Island specific coastal mapping software created by the University of Rhode
Island, map the extent and water depth for 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10- and 12-foot sea level rise
scenarios” (Council 2021). Rhode Island experiences statewide impacts even within the
lowest scenario of 1 foot. Significant impacts really begin to be prevalent within Newport
County at the 3-foot sea rise level, with both Washington County and Newport County
experiencing significant impacts to over 863 critical residents, facilities, and commercial
structures (Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency 2018).
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1.4 Evacuation of Aquidneck Island during Hurricanes
Managing future hurricane disasters for NAVSTA Newport and Aquidneck Island requires
a combination of protection and emergency response activities. Physical protection options
include built and natural systems that attenuate the impacts of flooding. Emergency op-
erations include community and military planning to evacuate and provide disaster relief
to flood-impacted communities. Evacuation is particularly important for NAVSTA New-
port and Aquidneck Island communities. Aquidneck Island contains the city of Newport,
townships Middletown and Portsmouth, as well as NAVSTA Newport. All three of these
municipalities with the Naval Base combined encompasses a population of approximately
65K (United States Census Bureau 2019).
Emergency management for Aquidneck Island communities is coordinated by the Rhode
Island EmergencyManagement Agency (RIEMA) and locally implemented by eachmunici-
pality. RIEMAhas established a State EmergencyOperation Plan (EOP) that outlines Rhode
Island’s statewide approach toward coordination and planning during large-scale disasters.
This plan is very broad in scope and delegates the creation of specifically tailored EOP to
each municipality. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for assisting communities
in developing maps that outline the various evacuation zones and which communities reside
within them. These zones are then activated during specific hurricane events to assist in
understanding which at-risk populations should be evacuated. One specific example for
Newport is seen in (Figure 1.2).
Different Aquidneck Island communities are required to evacuate for different hurricane
events. A culmination of all three evacuation zones (Figure 1.2, 1.3, 1.4) show that the
entire perimeter of Aquidneck Island, which includes NAVSTA Newport, is designated as
Evacuation Zone A, meaning that it is expected to evacuate prior to a Hurricane Category
1 or 2 event (Nicholson et al. 2017). Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth also have areas
within evacuation Zone B that are recommended to be evacuated during a Category 3 or
4 hurricane (Nicholson et al. 2017). Hurricanes in this region have continued to remain a
fairly common occurrence, and those events coupledwith the restrictive nature of Aquidneck
Islands road network makes evacuation of these population centers quite challenging.
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Figure 1.2. Hurricane Emergency Evacuation Zone for city of Newport,
Rhode Island. Area in red corresponds to Zone A, which are areas to be
evacuated during a Category 1 or 2 hurricane. Region in yellow corresponds
to Zone B, areas which are to be evacuated during a Category 3 or 4 hurri-
cane. Source: Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (2013).
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Figure 1.3. Hurricane Emergency Evacuation Zone for Middletown, Rhode
Island. Area in red corresponds to Zone A, which are areas to be evacuated
during a Category 1 or 2 hurricane. Region in yellow corresponds to Zone
B, which are to be evacuated during a Category 3 or 4 hurricane. Source:
Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (2013).
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Figure 1.4. Hurricane Emergency Evacuation Zone for Portsmouth, Rhode
Island. Region in red corresponds to Zone A, which are areas to be evacuated
during a Category 1 or 2 hurricane. Region in yellow corresponds to Zone B,
which are to be evacuated during a Category 3 or 4 hurricane. From Rhode
Island Emergency Management Agency (2013).
Successful evacuation depends on the functioning of the Aquidneck Island road network
and knowing the direction and path civilian and military communities need to travel to
escape disaster. Aquidneck Island is a commuter island, with 38,500 jobs but only 26,100
households, meaning a majority of the island’s population are daily commuters on and off
the island (Town of Middletown Local Hazard Mitigation Committee Town of Middletown
Planning Board 2014). However, Aquidneck Island’s road network relies heavily on a north
to south travel corridor of just two major roads, West Main Road (Routes 114) and East
Main Road (Route 138). Another contributor to the Island’s congestion is a portion of
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cut-through roads that allow drivers who have no origin or destination on the island but
instead are crossing the island’s bridges as a means to travel to other locations utilizing the
states regional highway system. This centralized and restrictive road network combinedwith
the large volume of daily commuters creates heavy traffic volume and major intersection
congestion.
The success of evacuation also depends on the capacity to provide safe refuge to evacuees
once they reach their final destination. During evacuation orders, as delineated by RIEMA,
Rhode Island communities are instructed to open designated shelters in order to accommo-
date evacuees. In the event that community shelters do not meet the required capacity, other
community facilities can be designated to provide temporary, safe refuge to those individ-
uals affected by the hurricane hazards. Each city is responsible for identifying in their EOP
pre-designated shelters and their capacities. This does not imply that these specific loca-
tions will be used during every evacuation scenario as the choice for evacuation facilities
is still an operational decision maintained at the local level and highly scenario dependent.
Evacuation needs at the local level are hard to forecast due to uncontrollable behavior of
evacuees. Residents can choose to not evacuate, travel to a variety of available shelters or
hotels/motels outside of the evacuation zone, or even find safe destinations elsewhere.
Ultimately, emergency management on Aquidneck Island is not handled statewide or even
regionally, but exists solely at the local township and city level. Historically, communities
have shown a willingness to work together after large-scale flooding events. However,
decisions on when to evacuate and, which paths to take are determined at the municipal level
and might not be coordinated with other municipalities. Moreover, NAVSTA Newport and
Department of Defense (DOD) evacuation decisions and paths might not be coordinated
with the municipalities that surround them. As with most disasters, the impetus toward
action regarding emergency planning and cross township coordination is typically a massive
disruptive event where deficiencies and planning gaps are then discovered.
1.5 Purpose
As shown in this chapter, there is a vast history of hurricane disasters in Rhode Island and
existing plans and efforts to improve disaster resilience for Aquidneck Island. Moreover,
there has been extensive research done on the impact of flooding and climate change on
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transportation networks in Rhode Island. These past studies help emergency planners for
Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth produce viable emergency disaster plans for each
of their individual areas, respectively.
However, coordination among DOD installations and local communities has yet to take
place, and no disaster plan for local municipalities has included NAVSTA Newport or con-
siders how military operations must continue even during an evacuation. This work focuses
on understanding these relationships inside and outside the fence line to support both com-
munity and military installation resilience. Specifically, we develop a model that determines
the capacity of the existing road system to support civilian and military evacuation given
future hurricane disasters.
The next chapter reviews research on the resilience of transportation systems during various
storm phases and the methods used to create various evacuation plans. Chapter 3 presents
our proposed model and our selected case study location of Aquidneck Island in Rhode
Island, followed by our analysis in Chapter 4. Finally, after the analysis, we provide our




Globalization, increased urbanization and climate change are all factors that have increased
not only the occurrence of disasters, but also ones that now affect much larger centralized
populations. Communities like those on Aquidneck Island in conjunction with military
installations are becoming increasingly more complex, and therefore so are the challenges
they face. This chapter discusses current research on various evacuation modeling methods
that lay a foundation for our analysis into understanding and quantifying the resilience of
Aquidneck Island communities and NAVSTA to evacuate when faced with a disaster.
There is extensive literature that discusses many impacting factors on traffic congestion and
resilience of a transportation network. Areas that have been studied are routing behavior,
evacuation of populations by various means when disaster locations are known versus
unknown, as well as storm modeling and the impact of storm surge and sea level rise. There
is, however, limited research that looks at these factors in combination with each other. Here,
we review key studies done in each of these areas and then conclude with our contributions
to this area of analysis.
2.1 Basic Tenets of Transportation Modeling
As our population increases, so does the number of vehicles on the roadways. Traffic
congestion has become a normal phenomenonwithin our urbanized transportation networks.
Literature suggests ways to alleviate this congestion are to use models that utilize macro
or micro methodologies in order to better understand the dynamics of traffic flow, which
continue to be influenced by route choices, capacity, and most importantly disruptions.
Reviewing specificmodels can provide insight into themethods for analyzing and predicting
traffic.
2.1.1 Micro and Macro Traffic Models
Trafficmodels are typically classified based on the scale and level of detail, as eithermicro or
macromodels. Micro models afford the user the most amount of traffic flow detail, focusing
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on the single vehicular unit and effects of travel during various types of disruptions. Gazis
et al. (1960) proposed an early use of this methodology in their follow-the-leader model
where traffic speed was determined based on the spacing between the lead vehicle and the
vehicle behind it, assuming the vehicle in tow keeps safe distance. The optimal velocity
model proposed by Bando et al. (1995) analyzes speed of an individual vehicle not only
based on the vehicle in front but also the influence that comes from the neighboring vehicles.
Both of these models imply that the speed it takes to get from an origin to a destination is
determined based on the velocity of the lead vehicle. The leading difference between the
two models is how vehicle velocity is determined by which stimulus the driver of the vehicle
responds to.
Macro models are inherently less detailed because they are conducted on a much larger
scale, analyzing vehicles in such a sufficiently large quantity that they are analyzed as more
of a flow or a stream. This approach “estimates the efficiency of a road network’s density”
using the averages of a large quantity of vehicles combined with the variables of flow,
speed, and density and has less computational time than micro models (Jan et al. 2009).
Jan et al. (2009) looked at freeway flow and congestion in the San Francisco Bay area using
a modified version of the macroscopic model developed by Kurzhanskiy (2007) called the
LinkNode Cell Transmission Model. In this model the freeway is a unidirectional network
with vertices and edges, where every edge is a road segment, and the vertices represent
junctions between these edges (Jan et al. 2009). Road density, flow, and congestion was
determined by the number of vehicles per lane of traffic moving from node to node. This
traffic flow research was narrowly focused on a single segment of the I-80 East freeway
in the San Francisco Bay area, and the only disruptions analyzed were those caused by
increased vehicular capacity.
2.1.2 Four-Step Travel Models
All the model methodologies described above follow a basic formulation of mobility mod-
eling called the four-step traffic assignment model, (Figure 2.1). There are slight naming
variations of the basic formulation steps by different researchers. Those four steps as de-
scribed by Ahmed (2012) are (1) trip generation; (2) trip distribution; (3) mode choice; and
(4) trip assignment.
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Figure 2.1. Four-Step Traffic Assignment Model. Adapted from Ahmed
(2012).
Step 1. Trip Generation: Trip generation estimates the number of trips within a particular
region. Regions have common characteristics with regard to demographic and land use
similarities, meaning assumptions can be made regarding the fact that population centers
will generate primarily trip productions (i.e., origins) while nonresidential zones will be
utilized for trip attractions (i.e., destinations). Trip generation starts with the reason behind
travel is calculated as trips per household from a specified origin to a destination.
This stage in the four-step travel model determines the frequency that individuals may travel
from a given origin to a destination. Trip generation does not specify when trips occur
within a day or over which transportation mode (e.g., car, bus, etc.).
Trip generation in previous work by Good (2019) and Routley (2020) identified ports and
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population centers (representing entire communities) as origins and supply centers for food,
fuel and construction material as destinations. Both traffic models focused on whether or
not the United States Virgin Islands (USVI) transportation network, in the aftermath of
a disaster, was resilient enough to handle the required round trips individuals needed to
perform within a specific time frame (Good 2019; Routley 2020).
Step 2. Trip Distribution: Trip generation then feeds into the trip distribution step, which
is where the number of trips between one identified location and all other locations is
determined. Traffic and mobility is time-based, such that two vehicles traveling on the same
road at different times of day may not interact with each other. The purpose of the trip
distribution step is to model the choice of when and where to travel given origin-destination
pairs. The output is an Origin-Destination (OD) matrix for a given time period, indicating
total travel demands for the transportation network.
Trip distribution is important when attempting to balance traffic flow and reduce congestion
because it considers issues affecting actual mobility choices, such as the distance between
the origin and the desired destination within the transportation network and the volume
of drivers desiring to go to each location. Ideally, all generated trips will be accomplished
utilizing the most direct path. However, as capacity increases and disruptions occur, a varied
number of desired trips may go unaccomplished.
In practice, an OD matrix need not be predefined when designating travel. For example,
Good (2019) and Routley (2020) conduct analysis using models that are both non-specific
when it comes to their origin-destination matrix. Instead of assigning a specific destination
to a specific origin, both models analyze whether or not a specific traveler can achieve a
round trip between origin and destination given a specific time window. Within the model,
the authors include rules such as commodity desired (e.g., food) that dictate how travelers
may choose one route over another and allow these distribution rules to affect travel model
results. Bothmodels utilize a 40/40/20 numerical split when determining howmany vehicles
from each population origin would travel to gas stations, grocery stores and hardware stores,
respectively.
Good (2019) and Routley (2020) also consider ports and the last-mile delivery of supplies
from them. Ports are designated as origins, and instead of calculating individual trips for
the supply trucks leaving the ports, each port has to make a single round trip to all gas
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stations, grocery stores, and hardware stores. As long as a vehicle from a household or port
completes a round trip to their destination(s) within their category (i.e., any gas station or
any grocery store), then the model records it as successful. Vehicles unable to reach their
final destination within the given time window do not travel and incur a penalty cost for the
network, where the travel objective is to reduce this penalty as much as possible.
Step 3. Mode Choice: In general, neither Steps 1 or 2 make assumptions about mode of
travel. According to Xuedong et al. (2012), “a traveler’s decision on transportation mode
is generally influenced by a combination of travel time and other factors.” Once a mode
choice has been chosen, the individual’s next goal is to minimize their travel time to their
intended destination by choice of route.
While many cities and towns have multi-modal transportation systems, the majority of
the research focuses on personal use vehicles. This is partly due to additional difficulty
simulating a multi-modal system than that of a private car roadway system. For example,
only a small population within the USVI uses public transportation. For this reason, Good
(2019) and Routley (2020) use the same assumption within their traffic models, which is
that all trips are exercised by the maximum number of personal vehicles leaving from each
origin.
Step 4. Traffic Assignment: The traffic assignment step is used to calculate performance
measures within the network being modeled. This step identifies the percentages of pop-
ulations that actually transit between selected origin and destination locations based on
mode choice and trip distribution. The selection of traffic assignment is usually selected
using mathematical models, which are based upon Wardrop’s principle (Wardrop 1952),
which states “that capacity of the network is defined by its flow, which is the minimum
acceptable speed between mean speed and journey time.” Flows are therefore assigned to
the shortest path that subsequently also demonstrates the smallest travel delays. But due to
the randomness in traffic behavior there are many factors that can cause congestion, making
perhaps the shortest path not necessarily the one that has the most minimum delay.
A classic approach to assigning traffic to a transportation model assumes that all traffic
flow moving across the network remains in a constant state of equilibrium. This assumption
correlates to a static traffic assignment, which while helpful in some modeling contexts,
neglects important traffic flow phenomena. More accurately, when traffic flow is modeled
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this way, it ignores a realistic tendency, which is that increased flow on the roads commonly
results in increased travel time. It is this increased travel time, that when used as a penalty,
forces route changes that produce the cheapest cost (less total time to travel to destination)
for each vehicle. Since our research is focused on population clearing times as well as
the effects of zone-based evacuation, we utilize the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) power
function to induce these types of realistic capacity constraints. This BPR formula (2.1)
expresses travel time ) as a function of flow @ over each road segment (Maerivoet and
De Moor 2005).




Here, ) 5 5 is the travel time under free flow conditions, @?2 is the practical capacity of the
road segment under consideration, and U, V are parameters that change the shape of the
function. When flow is low, the BPR function remains rather flat, and the travel time reflects
what is typically seen under free-flow conditions () 5 5 ) where no traffic congestion occurs.
As the flow approaches the capacity of the road segment (@?2), the total travel time increases
nonlinearly (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2. The Bureau of Public Roads BPR Function. Relates travel time to
vehicle flow across road segments under free flow conditions and the capacity
of the road segment being analyzed. Source: Maerivoet and De Moor (2005)
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Good (2019) and Routley (2020) consider “selfish” and “coordinated” routing behaviors
to determine the destinations to which vehicles choose to travel. A “selfish” decision is a
destination that brings the most gain to the individual at the expense of what is best for the
group as a whole; individuals choose to travel to the closest location to them despite travel
time or congestion. A “coordinated” decision is one that incorporates shared information
and produces benefits that are applied to the whole group even though the individual
might experience a loss. Individuals are routed to locations that might be inconvenient
for the traveler (e.g., by increasing that person’s travel time), but enabling better traffic
flow throughout the entire road network. Ultimately, one must recognize that even when
individuals are provided a coordinated and individualized traffic route that ensures the
network achieves a global optimal solution regarding travel time, in reality some travelers
will still choose sub-optimal alternative routes that are most optimal for them as individuals,
thus, the selfish decision.
Po et al. (2020) implemented such a transportation model, which they called the cavity
method, where users were given globally optimal solutions based on their origin-destination
selection, but some users in fact chose not to follow the recommendation but instead choose
their route. This cavity method showed that within uncoordinated transportation networks,
small quantities of selfish route-choices can actually improve the networks performance
locally, but overall, the efficiency of the network is degraded, producing results far from
optimal (Po et al. 2020). Even with a slight improvement in network performance, this
research also confirmed that when the fraction of selfish users increases, the level of
congestion produced also subsequently increases, which produced an overall decreased
performance over the entire network.
2.1.3 Use of Travel Models
Transportation modeling and simulation have become the foundation for many types of
network research. The micro and macro four-step travel models are used for numerous real-
world decisions, such as predicting travel time of a route given current traffic and long-term
planning of new routes in road networks. We focus attention on the use of these models for
supporting emergency response and evacuation planning before a disaster happens.
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2.2 EvacuationModels UnderBothCertain andUncertain
Disaster Locations
Evacuation is one of the cornerstones of emergency management, and even with advances
made in current technology and storm tracking, it’s still nearly impossible to determine
with precision where a flooding or hurricane event might occur, when it might occur and to
what degree of severity might be experienced. The strategy then becomes to protect people
during times of disaster, which is controllable. Evacuation can be limited in scope, such as
escaping from a burning structure, or extremely complex, such as a city-wide evacuation
due to a man-made or natural disaster. Evacuation plans are typically tailored in relation to
the scope and nature of the emergency. In this study, we focus on establishing an optimal
evacuation plan given large-scale disaster on an island region restricted by water on all
sides, multiple independently managed cities and towns, a condensed road network, and
few avenues for egress.
The main purpose of any evacuation plan is to identify optimal evacuation routes as well
as determine the time needed to fully evacuate an at-risk population. Many after-action
reviews for past disasters, like the one conducted by the Office of Homeland Security
following Hurricane Katrina, conclude that a major contributor to the number of deaths was
an ineffective evacuation plans and/or insufficient time to evacuate (United States. Executive
Office of the President and United States. 2006). Evacuation plans require the integration of
many variables, like defining appropriate evacuation regions, identifying shelter locations,
and providing optimally configured evacuation routes. Some of the earliest examples of
using transportation modeling to make informed decisions involves mass evacuations for
areas surrounding nuclear power stations (Hardy and Wunderlich 2009). More recently,
studies have considered natural disasters that lead to evacuation, like hurricanes, wildfires,
and tsunami. We review several of these studies to present the current state of methods and
models for evacuation planning using transportation models.
2.2.1 Evacuation Models and Methodology When Disaster Locations
are Known
To achieve a controlled evacuation, an understanding of the traffic patterns within an ur-
banized region is required. Many traffic assignment models are based on solving stochastic
location-allocation problems. Common models of this type are the stochastic user equilib-
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rium (SUE), user equilibrium (UE), system optimal (SO), and nearest allocation (NA). The
SUE and UE methodologies model the most selfish of evacuee behavior where evacuees
choose the shortest travel time path based on either perceived travel time or the assumption
that they have perfect information about every route (Bayram and Yaman 2018). These
models are limited in that although they mostly minimize individual travel times, the total
evacuation time within the evacuation network is not equally minimized. This is counter-
productive to the goal of emergency management, which is to evacuate everyone as safely
and quickly as possible.
The evacuation management objective is more readily achieved using the SO or NAmodels,
which are structured more in line with coordinated behavior. The SOmodel chooses to send
some evacuees to shelter locations much farther away than where they would individually
choose in order to maximize the benefit for all other evacuees. One problem with the SO
model however is that asking evacuees to accept traveling longer distances while trying to
flee a danger zone is not typically accepted by the majority of the population. The slight
difference in the NA model is that shelter location is chosen based on either the shortest
geographical distance or shortest travel time to reach the destination. This approach has the
advantage of being readily accepted by most evacuees but does still have the potential to
lead to poor overall network performance.
Hobeika et al. (1994) created a software package called the transportation evacuation
decision support system (TEDSS) that enabled users to “prepare detailed evacuation plans,
including evacuation times, best routes, expected bottlenecks and allocation of evacuees to
different shelters.” A cornerstone of this model, similar to those in Good (2019) and Routley
(2020), are the characteristics of the highway network such as the identification of nodes,
the distances between them, and the speed of road types as well as their capacity. Socio-
economic similarities also include determining population and auto availability needed to
produce the number of trips per evacuation zone. TEDSS is advanced in the ways that it
also takes inputs such as tourists, special facility data, school attendees and size of labor
force (Hobeika et al. 1994). This information is important because unlike Good and Routley,
this model analyzes three time categories and two different evacuation scenarios: weekday,
weeknight and weekend time phases combined with evacuations purely coming from home
locations and another where evacuations come from both home and from work. A similar
assumption between the models discussed so far is that in the supply chain models of Good
25
(2019) and Routley (2020), vehicles travel to their closest designated destination and return,
and in TEDSS, evacuees strive to evacuate thru their closest exit point. Closeness in both
scenarios is measured in terms of shortest travel time, not necessarily shortest path.
Unlike other models requiring extensive detail, TEDSS is an example of a macroscopic
model. While comprehensive in what it is intended to do, it does however still have its
limitations. TEDSS was created to help inform planners faced with evacuations due to
nuclear disasters. Unlike floods and hurricanes, nuclear disasters have a fixed location with
a well-defined region of impact making the evacuation routes that TEDSS identifies quite
fixed and relatively stable, only requiring moderate updates in the future once established.
Bayram and Yaman (2018) extended these basic modeling methodologies and proposed a
two-staged scenario-based stochastic evacuation model that optimally assigned evacuees to
shelter locations while also minimizing total evacuation time. This bi-level model brought
together the benefits from both SO and UE models. Shelter locations were identified by
SO methodology, and the assignment of evacuees to shelters and the routes provided were
determined using UE methodology.
So far all of these traffic flow models produce optimal evacuation routes for networks
constrained only by road congestion, in other words, the relationship between traffic speed
and traffic volume. These studies lack an analysis into how those road networks would
be impacted and whether or not population evacuations remain feasible if specific portions
becameunusable. There is ambiguity in evacuation that stems from the uncertainties inherent
to disasters and the resulting impacts caused by the degradation of a road network structure
such as loss of a road, a bridge, or a tunnel. Understanding the impacts of disruption and
interdependencies is critical to assess and improve the resiliency of any transportation
network.
Alderson et al. (2018) developed a defender-attack-defender (DAD) model to identify where
to apply limited resources in order tomaximize performancewithin a highway networkwhen
impacted by a worst-case loss of its physical components such as a road, bridge, or tunnel.
This model was applied to a study of a major bridge and tunnel highway system within
the San Francisco Bay Area that is impacted by a targeted terrorist attack. Alderson et al.
(2018) still applied the BPR function for congestion with the SO methodology for traffic
assignment, but instead of presenting a single level or even bi-level model similar to Bayram
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and Yaman (2018), they solved a tri-level DADmodel using nested Bender’s decomposition.
Another unique aspect of this DAD model was implementation of time epochs, in fact a
multi-period model that evaluated traffic patterns after given time periods, allowing for
infrastructure recovery after damages to one or more targets after the attack.
The multi-period model in Alderson et al. (2018) was important because it looked at more
than just the performance of a road network immediately following an attack. Their model
revealed longer term impacts to traffic flow and the interdependencies that were created from
not only the disruption of combinations of highway segments but also varying restoration
time.A few assumptions applied to this body ofworkwas thatmass transit was not accounted
for as an option to help alleviate traffic flow, themodel did not account for random events like
traffic accidents, and the attacker was resource constrained as far as how many attacks could
be made. Alderson et al. (2018) presented a valid method to assess a system’s resilience
when faced with component loss as well as provide planners with recommendations for how
to maximize resilience under a resource constrained environment. This analysis, however,
was conducted with an awareness of where the attacks would occur. The next phase would
be testing the effectiveness of this multi-phased time-based model to random events like
natural disasters.
2.2.2 Time-Phased Modeling Approaches and the Impacts on Evacu-
ation within Congested Transportation Networks
Traffic congestion is a common phenomenon within road transportation networks and thus
far the traffic flow evacuation centric models have all been analyzed under static, pre-
determined, post-disaster conditions. Traffic flow patterns are however dynamic in nature,
responding uniquely to disruptions that are caused over the course of the disaster. Time
phased approaches to traffic modelling investigates the dynamic evolution of traffic flows
on individual roads and the propagation of interactions that affect population clearing times
within arbitrarily selected time moments.
Yuhas (2011) created a single-commodity, multi-period minimum cost network flow model
that focused on the evacuation routes and clearance times of residents within the California
counties of Yolo, Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Stanislaus on a macroscopic, strategic level
where vehicles were modeled as aggregate flows. The model assumed travelers had “perfect
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knowledge” of road conditions before evacuation, that roads were devoid of vehicles until
the evacuation order was given, that only highways were used for evacuation routes, and the
only constraint to vehicular flow was traffic capacity (Yuhas 2011). Yuhas analyzed whether
or not residents had enough time during any single time period to reach a safe destination
point. If unable to achieve this goal due to road capacity, then the resident remained stranded
until the next time epoch. Yuhas incorporated contra-flowmethodology and pre-defined road
capacities to assess the potential to improve evacuation times by minimizing both highway
inundations and the number of permanently stranded residents within this road network.
Malveo (2013) also studied clearing times but alternatively used a minimum cost flow with
congestion assignment (MCF-CA) model to analyze the evacuation times of residents in
Mobile County and Baldwin County in Alabama and Escambia County in Florida. Conges-
tion assignment was based on the number of vehicles driving on each road segment and the
maximum speed at which those vehicles were able to travel across that same road segment.
Unique to Malveo (2013), the model considered three congestion levels (none, moderate
and high) for each highway segment during each time epoch and incorporated similar as-
sumptions as Yuhas (2011) that evacuation would only be conducted using highways, that
all roads within the network were available for evacuation and that roads were empty until
the evacuation order was given.
The mesoscopic transportation analysis of evacuation clearance times in Malveo (2013) is
similar to that from Yuhas (2011) in that is it a multi-period evacuation model. However, the
model in Malveo (2013) used the time-dependent speed flow function from Akçelik (2003)
and limited the number of vehicles allowed to transverse each segment due to congestion
level within the MCF-CA model during each time period. Implementation of MCF-CA in a
rolling horizon fashion limited residents’ prior knowledge of traffic conditions and allowed
for studies to be conducted on how this limited knowledge impacted evacuation patterns
once the order to evacuate was given.Malveo (2013) alsomodeled the impact of sub-optimal
routing decisions when residents exhibit selfish behaviors by choosing their own shortest
path rather than the globally optimal route.
Just like in Yuhas (2011), the MCF-CA model’s main constraint on clearing times was
purely traffic congestion. This study did not investigate accidents that might occur during
evacuation or roads that were either impeded to begin with or became unusable during the
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time phases, which has the potential to cause important secondary effects on the clearing
times.
2.2.3 Mass Evacuation Utilizing Public Transportation
Evacuating the maximum number of people that reside within an disaster risk zone before
a hurricane makes landfall is extremely important. Once a disaster occurs, due to stranded
individuals or those who simply choose not to evacuate, place an additional burden on
emergency personnel when it comes to now needing to provide assistance and distribute
relief materials. This additional surge of demand inevitably further impedes and complicates
resident evacuation. Existing research focuses on the available capacity within the road
networks to reduce congestion and allow for the maximum number of evacuees to travel to
safe destinations.
One common assumption that can be found in many evacuation models is that the at-risk
population will utilize their personal vehicles to evacuate vice multi-modal transportation
assets. This assumption can be misleading when trying to analyze how quickly an at-risk
population can evacuate pre-disaster if the car-less population in the affected area tends
to be much higher due to the fact that public transportation is the main vehicle for daily
commute.
Swamy et al. (2017) presented a framework to address the issue of the evacuation of
people who solely depend on public transportation. They “developed a simulation tool
to model the dispatching of buses, the stochastic arrival of evacuees at pickup locations,
and the transportation of those individuals to designated safety locations” (Swamy et al.
2017). This multi-stage heuristic model was employed on a targeted area of New York City,
specifically Brooklyn, using historical data collected from Hurricane Sandy to evaluate
the effectiveness of using mass transportation as an approach to alleviate road congestion
and enable quicker clearing times during times of mass evacuation. Although this work
is beneficial in determining new ways to influence routing design within a traffic network
during times of disaster by utilizing public transportation, our research utilizes the base
assumption that all residents will evacuate using their own vehicle.
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2.3 StormModeling and Flooding Impacts to Transporta-
tion Networks
Transportation infrastructure has expanded immensely over the past four decades and as a
result of disasters like 9/11 as well as recent hurricanes, emergency management personnel
continue to develop storm tracking models to enable a better understanding and prediction
of the characteristics of evacuations. Some of the most current and widely used macroscopic
models are discussed in this section.
2.3.1 SLOSH Model
The National Weather Service (NWS) has developed a widely accepted flooding model
called Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) that predicts storm
surge and estimates of geographic locations that could be flooded based on a given set
of conditions. After recent model updates in 2013, Forbes et al. (2014) applied this new
SLOSH model to those conditions recorded from Hurricane Sandy in order to validate its
predictions of storm surge threat against what was predicted by the SLOSH model in 2012.
The goal was to “quantify its ability to replicate the height, timing, evolution and extent of
the water that was driven ashore by this large, destructive storm” (Forbes et al. 2014).
Within 48 hours of identification of any tropical disturbance that has the potential of
developing into a tropical cyclone in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, or the Gulf of
Mexico, NWS uses SLOSH to begin generating storm surge forecast simulations(Forbes
et al. 2014). This was the case in 2012 with Hurricane Sandy, where in surge-only mode,
SLOSHwas used to run simulations to help NationalWeather Center (NWC) identify where
the greatest storm surge threatswere expected to appear. In the aftermath ofHurricane Sandy,
it appears that the predictions from SLOSH at that time produced an error of approximately
20%-30%. However, at that time SLOSH simulations did not account for tide data; this
numerical enhancement was introduced during the 2013 upgrade.
Analysis of an upgraded SLOSH version modeled in (Forbes et al. 2014) produced a root
mean squared error within a 10%–20% range between water levels at all of the NOAA
tidal gauges, United States Geological Survey (USGS) storm surge sensors and High-Water
Marks compared against the SLOSH model-simulated maximum water levels (Forbes et al.
2014). Even with this overall high level of accuracy, the SLOSH model did underestimate
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water levels in some areas, mainly in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, which
Forbes et al. (2014) attributed to factors such as lack of grid resolution as well as tidal waves
in those regions within the simulations. The highly complex nature of Sandy with regard to
her wind speeds and erratic forward movement caused minor prediction errors within the
SLOSH model, and because of this there is a plan to upgrade this parametric wind model
in the future.
Ultimately, Forbes et al. (2014) concluded that this newer model “was able to simulate the
height, timing, evolution, and extent of the water that was driven ashore by Hurricane Sandy
(2012) with a high degree of fidelity”, and that by including tide data increased the accuracy
of the model, and can subsequently enable forecasters in better predicting the extent of water
level and storm surge inundation.
2.3.2 HURREVAC
The Hurricane Evacuation (HURREVAC) software program was developed by FEMA
specifically to assist with hurricane evacuations. The main purpose of this forecasting tool
is to identify the approach path of a hurricane, as well as its speed and intensity, and
then produce a graphic display to help visualize evacuation timing. Additionally, it can
take inundation estimates from the SLOSH model as well as a variety of other inputs to
provide estimates on flooding potential to better inform evacuation timing. This makes the
combination of both this software program and the SLOSHmodel a very powerful resource.
Emergency planners can therefore better identify who is at risk, when decisions need to
be made to ensure the safety of impacted populations, and how the risk changes as the
dynamics of the hurricane change.
HURREVAC still has some inconsistencies that emergency planners need to be aware of
(Kirlik 2007). There is an increased error in track and intensity during the early stages of
the hurricane formation when the storm is still quite a distance from shore. To account for
this increased error, it is important that emergency planners place a larger region of the
shoreline under the hurricane watch and warning than what will most likely be impacted.
There are also many other factors that go into the decision-making calculus to evacuate that
HURREVAC estimates do not account for, such as tourist population, special events, road
closures, and time of day.
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Despite its inconsistencies, this computer-based decision support tool has in fact been shown
to be successful. For example, it was used during Hurricane Katrina (2005) in determining
when to evacuate New Orleans. It is widely purported that the emergency response failed
during Hurricane Katrina, and while that assessment might be true, one must remember that
there is more to an evacuation decision than just what a computer program recommends.
When it comes to the validity of this tracking tool and what it was created to do, according
to the National Hurricane Center (NHC), “the forecasts were timely and effective and within
about two and half days before landfall were exceptionally accurate and consistent. Errors
were considerably less that than the average official track errors for the 10-year period from
1995-2004” (Kirlik 2007).
2.3.3 ETIS Model
Another web-based modeling program used in conjunction with other storm tracking tools
is the Evacuation Traffic Information System (ETIS). ETIS is a program that allows states
and FEMA tomonitor the entire evacuation process as it is occurring. It was deployed for the
first time by the Department of Transportation (DOT) for the coastal areas of Louisiana and
Texas, which were issued evacuation orders during the approach of Hurricane Lili in 2002.
After Hurricane Floyd in 1999, it became very evident that there was much improvement
needed in interstate communication. ETIS incorporated many of the lessons learned from
significant traffic problems that occurred during the Hurricane Floyd evacuation in addition
to real-time data such as weather information, evacuation percentages and tourist occupancy
rates in affected areas and successfully helpedmanage the evacuation of over 500,000 people
(Post and Buckley and Schuh and Jernigan, Inc. 2003).
This macroscopic standalone model was developed to primarily assist with forecasting
large cross-state traffic volume in the event of large-scale evacuations. Implementation of
future hurricane studies, road closures, close to real-time information regarding vehicular
accidents and increased linkage with traffic sensors at strategic locations that better identify
traffic congestion will aid emergency planners in identifying better evacuation routes as
well as staging evacuation times in order to moderate traffic flow as much as possible.
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2.4 Past StormModeling Studies and Analysis into Infras-
tructure Resilience Specific to Rhode Island
Most of the literature found regarding prior studies done in Rhode Island of impacts from
storm surge and increasing sea level rise are more qualitative in nature and focus mainly
on Providence, Rhode Island. Not only does “the length and orientation of Rhode Island’s
Narragansett Bay, and its proximity to the Atlantic hurricane zone, make it susceptible to
extreme storm surges”, but Providence is also referred to by FEMA as the “Achilles’s heel
of the Northeast” (Rubinoff 2007; Becker et al. 2015).
Many ports had suffered extensive damage from past hurricanes even before climate change
and its associated sea level rise. Due to the economic importance of the Port of Providence
for the state of Rhode Island, Becker et al. (2015) conducted a fine-grained analysis of
the impact from future hurricanes as well as the inclusion of anticipated sea level rise on
that seaport. Their research simulated multiple category 3 and 4 storm scenarios together
with storm surge overlays and 3D modeling that was constructed to represent the structures
of the Port of Providence. Their study focused on conducting key stakeholder interviews,
reviewing port planning and policy documents to evaluate the current level of resiliency
within the Port of Providence and identifying which stakeholders were best positioned
to implement specific recommended improvement strategies (Becker et al. 2015). This
exploratory analysis was not a quantitative detailed assessment like the evacuation and
traffic studies reviewed above, as it did not focus on the magnitude, linkage, or probability
of the various impacts between storm surge and rising sea level on the Port of Providence
nor the transportation system it feeds into.
Witkop et al. (2019) shifted the focus from resilience of port infrastructure and supply
chain to assisting in developing consequence thresholds for combinations of hydrodynamic,
wind and precipitation-based storm models. Westerly Rhode Island was chosen because the
small number of critical facilities located in this area were found to have a higher degree of
exposure to hazards than other surrounding areas. This high degree of connection between
facilities and hazards better enabled researchers to uncover any critical inter dependencies
and cascading consequences (Witkop et al. 2019). Becker et al. (2015) recognized a knowl-
edge gap between the community emergency planners and the creators of storm models.
Storm models employ high resolution simulations that draw data from historic events such
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as track, intensity, and size parameters in order to try to quantify potential implications of
future hazards. Becker et al. (2015) analyzed interviews conducted with multiple emergency
responders and facility managers and identified individual pieces of infrastructure and fa-
cilities that were then fed into existing storm models and discovered 193 “consequences”
that were impacted by storm hazards in either a hydrodynamic, wind or precipitation model
that had not been originally identified (Witkop et al. 2019). The storm impact model and
its underlying simulations increased both in accuracy and applicability. This study proved
that many of the storm models being utilized today lack the specificity that is understood by
those emergency responders at the community level, and failing to incorporate this knowl-
edge into a hazard model has an increased potential to lead to an underestimation of future
hazards.
STORMTOOLs is a specific model used by researchers that takes wind and sea level data
from the SLOSHmodel and calculates various levels of storm inundation over specific time
periods, and under conditions of both sea level rise and without for all of Rhode Island’s
coastal waters. At its most basic level, the model can provide flood estimates for coastal
planners and homeowners. At a more sophisticated level, it is used by emergency planners to
perform regional studies that support future coastal planning and emergency preparedness
planning. STORMTOOLs continues to be enhanced. One such enhancement is the creation
of the Coastal Environmental Risk Index (CERI) in 2016, which was first tested on areas in
Warwick and Charleston Rhode Island (Spaulding et al. 2019). It has since been expanded
to all of the southern coastline of Rhode Island and the combined results are presented in
Spaulding et al. (2019).
The building blocks of CERI are surge and waves specified in terms of the BFE, which is
the combination of inundation depth and the associated wave height. These BFEs are used
to characterize the flooding risk and damage functions from both waves and inundation are
estimated from Guise et al. (2015). Spaulding et al. (2019) focused on using CERI within
STORMTOOLs to visualize the BFE for specific 100-year flooding scenarios and estimate
the worst-case damage to structures along the coastline, however, using different base maps
that exist within STORMTOOLS, these same flooding scenarios can be used to identify the
inundation impact on roads and the transportation network within selected locations.
Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC) models have been utilized by Rhode Island emergency
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planners in the past for vulnerability analysis of specific geographic points impacted by
natural disasters. These models combined with the Simulating Waves Nearshore (SWAN)
model can calculate storm surge hazard impacts for specific time epochs, and then displays
the chronological effects of those hazards (Stempel et al. 2018). Incorporating weather data
into these models then provides emergency managers the ability to adjust and improve
evacuation orders once they assess the potential storm impacts before it ever makes landfall.
A majority of storm surge hazard modeling requires the integration of modeling platforms.
The transformation of ocean modeling data types and geographical data is required to prop-
erly combine the ADCIRC and SWANmodels. This reconfiguration can lead to inaccuracies
and undermine the legitimacy of the results. To improve computational efficiency and re-
duce the air gap that is created during this integration, Stempel et al. (2018) introduced an
all-numerical approach that instead allowed for both models to be run on the same plat-
form. This approach was tested in areas around Galilee, Rhode Island and validated against
historical data from Hurricane Carol. The results, when compared, did indicate an accurate
simulation of the maximum water level that was seen during the storm surge, but the du-
ration modeled was too short relative to what was actually observed (Stempel et al. 2018).
Even with the time duration inaccuracies, this all-numerical approach did demonstrate the
ability to accurately model the potential hazard impacts of a hurricane strike.
2.5 Our Contribution
Like much previous work, we also analyze a transportation network but, with a variety
of road types and various disruptions. We incorporate the major steps commonly used for
the transportation model described below, as well as implementing a hybrid transporta-
tion model based on micro variables on a macro scale. We use the basic formulation of
transportation used by Good (2019) and Routley (2020) with some enhancements regarding
flexible origins, destinations, and traffic trip choices. Models like Alderson et al. (2015) that
evaluated the operational resilience of critical infrastructure systems as well as some of the
earlier transportation models from Good (2019), Routley (2020) focused on a single time
period post disaster. Our research instead mirrors the time-phased modeling approaches
studied in Yuhas (2011) and Malveo (2013) that investigated cascading impacts to the road
network and evacuation clearing times before, during and after the hurricane. We provide
storm surge data on specific road inundations using time phased data outputs from the
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ADCIRC model.
Our research similarly studies individual trips of vehicles, but we do so on a macro level
regarding how the entire transportation network responds to the fast-acting stimulus of





The City of Newport and the townships of Middletown and Portsmouth have each iden-
tified evacuation routes all utilizing the same internal state roadway system that traverse
Aquidneck Island north to south. These evacuation routes are assumed to be best case,
but when combined with time-phased storm surge data from various hurricane scenarios,
the opportunity arises to discover optional routes that are in fact better suited for timely
evacuation when the road network is congested and constrained by flooding. Central to our
research, we construct an optimization model that overlays climate-induced hazards like
sea-level rise, storm surge, and inland flooding from the ADCIRC model on top of a con-
structed road network of Aquidneck Island. Together, this allows us to provide city planners
with alternative routes as well as a better understanding of population clearing times and
identification of higher at-risk populations given future disasters.
Overall, we develop methods to perform three main analysis tasks:
1. Data collection and Network Construction: We collect and combine datasets from
various sites in order to analyze the movement of vehicles across surface roads on
Aquidneck Island.
2. Formulation and Implementation of Model: We develop a four-stage traffic model
(refer to Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2) that measures evacuation clearing times from
affected coastal populations to reach mass evacuation locations both inland and off-
island during normal and degraded road conditions.
3. Evacuation Analysis: We utilize the curated datasets and traffic model to determine
the capability of Aquidneck Island surface roads to enable timely evacuation of all at-
risk populations that reside within the City of Newport, Middletown, Portsmouth, as
well as NAVSTA Newport. We identify which Aquidneck Island coastal populations
have the highest clearing times and those populations with the highest risk of isolation
during normal and worst-case flooding situations.
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3.1 Data Collection, Curation, and Analysis
The development of our model requires new data sets derived from diverse primary sources
andmodified using open-source software. The overall process used in this thesis is presented
in Figure 3.1. First, we collect data from three sources. We pull data files of the local and
state road networks from an Rhode Island’s online open-source geospatial repository Rhode
Island Geographic Information System (RIGIS) (Rhode Island Geographic Information
System (RIGIS) Data Distribution System 2017). Collaboration with Dr. Austin Becker’s
team from the University of Rhode Island provided consequence and impact data that is
collected using Survey 1-2-3 (Environmental Systems Research Institute 2021) as well as
hourly storm surge/flooding data for three specific hurricane scenarios generated within
ADCIRC (Luettich and Westerink 2004).
Data curation of these files is then done using open source Python-based tools to include
QGIS (QGIS Development Team 2021) and GeoPandas (Jordahl et al. 2020) for viewing,
editing, and analysis of geospatial data. We also use Geospatial Data Abstraction Library
(GDAL) (GDAL/OGR contributors 2021) for data conversion and management of ADCIRC
data, as the data sets are provided as irregular grids in Network Common Data Form
(NetCDF) file formats and converted to raster files for analysis. Our time phased evacuation
routing is analyzed using a network model built with the Pyomo optimization modeling
language (Hart et al. 2011). We visualize our results using Plotly, the java-script library
LEAFLET (Plotly Technologies Inc. 2015), and QGIS.
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Figure 3.1. Data Collection, Curation, and Analysis. Steps depicting the data
collection and generation process, how the data is curated as well as then
analyzed.
We present additional detail regarding the curation of all data sets developed in this thesis.
Specifically, we determine at-risk populations that will need to evacuate in future storms,
develop a road network data set for Aquidneck Island, and develop an evacuation model
that optimizes evacuation routing and timing.
3.1.1 At-Risk Populations
We identify which locations and how many people will evacuate during a future storm. Not
all populations should evacuate during a hurricane. If it is considered safe, sheltering in place
is generally the best option. In contrast, communities that experience significant flooding
can experience isolation and death if they do not evacuate. For this reason, we determine
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community locations and the quantity of people and vehicles expected at these locations.
We then identify which of these communities will flood in future storms. The combination
of this data develops a data set of just the at-risk populations that are recommended to
evacuate.
The U.S. Census Bureau maintains census tract shapefiles with associated population and
housing counts for each state. As census tracts are polygons representing a jurisdictional
area, they do not easily relate to road data used for evacuation that is generally a network of
nodes and arcs. We convert this data into population nodes representing contiguous houses
to more easily support evacuation analysis.
To establish the population nodes on Aquidneck Island, the most current census tract
shapefile for Rhode Island is downloaded and plotted in QGIS utilizing the Coordinate
Reference System (CRS) EPSG:4326. Rhode Island has 244 census tracts, which we filtered
down to just the census tracts for Aquidneck Island. Each census tract can be further
separated into blocks that contain detailed population and housing counts. Using this block
data, centroids were plotted for each census tract shape utilizing geometry tools available in
QGIS. Initially, 1104 centroids were plotted. In order to reduce the number of centroids, we
overlay these points over a Google Sat Hybrid layer and merge the centroids that were very
closely clustered and contained very small population counts. Locations of these centroids
were also inspected to ensure they were placed in locations that accurately reflected surface
road access. Final count of population centroids was 309 and can be seen in Figure 3.2
below.
In the event of an evacuation on Aquidneck Island, prior storm surge inundation studies
have highlighted at-risk areas along the entire coastline of the island for varying categories
of hurricanes. We take the historical probabilistic data from the STORMTOOLS model and
merge it with max flood storm surge inundation data from the ADCIRC model for the most
extreme Hurricane Sandy storm scenario combined with 5 ft of sea level rise (Spaulding
et al. 2016; Luettich and Westerink 2004). We overlay this combination of flooding data on
top of our population nodes and merge them by location, which highlights 55 population
centroids. We define the at-risk communities as these 55 population nodes that would need
to be evacuated in the event of a storm. The high risk flood areas and impacted populations
are shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.2. Population centroids on Aquidneck Island using census tracts
from 2010 census data plotted in QGIS.
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Figure 3.3. At-Risk Populations under Evacuation Zones. Identified popu-
lation nodes that fall within Evacuation Zones A & B based on STORM-
TOOLS and ADCIRC flooding data. Population nodes highlighted in gold,
Evacuation Zone A highlighted in blue and Evacuation Zone B highlighted
in yellow.
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Finally, we aggregate at-risk populations by city and Navy installation for evacuation plan-
ning. The breakdown of the 55 at-risk populations by city, township and the naval installation
is provided in Table 3.1 and the location of each node is presented in Figure 3.4. The city
of Newport has the largest impacted population that falls within the storm surge inundation
areas. According to the United States Census Bureau (2019), the average number of vehicles
per household in Newport County is two. When calculating the total number of vehicles, we
expect to see on the road, total number of households is multiplied by two. These vehicle
values are listed in Table 3.1. The exception to this, is for number of vehicles assumed
to be departing NAVSTA Newport and Naval Undersea Warfare Command (NUWC). Due
to the transient nature of the personnel stationed on NAVSTA Newport and NUWC, and
the majority residing in barracks and other lodgings, it is assumed that in the event of an
evacuation each individual will depart using their own vehicle and will not aggregate within
shared vehicles.
Table 3.1. At-Risk Population, Household, and Vehicle Data by City. Popula-
tion count, number of evacuees and vehicles by city (assuming 2 ppl/vehicle
except NAVSTA Newport and NUWC, which is 1 ppl/vehicle). Adapted from
United States Census Bureau (2019).
.
City Population Nodes Total Total Total
By City Population Households Vehicles
Newport 16 2326 1542 3084
Portsmouth 16 1582 785 1570
Middletown 2 605 232 464
NAVSTA Newport 13 1496 276 1496
NUWC 8 308 188 308
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Figure 3.4. At-Risk Population Locations. At-risk populations located within
each of the city boundary lines and military installations located on Aquid-
neck Island.
3.1.2 Road Network Construction
We use primary data sets from RIGIS with QGIS software to construct a road network
for evacuation modeling of Aquidneck Island. Within RIGIS is a database of road network
shapefiles that is maintained by the Department of Transportation. The Rhode Island shape-
file includes all of the highways and local roads for vehicular traffic across Rhode Island.
We filter this dataset to just the road network for Aquidneck Island and plot it in QGIS using
CRS EPG:4326 using OpenStreetMap as the base layer. Using geometry tools available in
QGIS, transshipment nodes are created by placing points along each intersection where a
local road connects to the main state roads that traverse the island as well as intersections be-
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tween local roads. This increases the fidelity of the road network and previously established
population, shelter, and evacuation nodes. Figure 3.5 displays the transshipment nodes for
Aquidneck Island.
Figure 3.5. Transshipment Nodes Plotted on Aquidneck Island. Highway and
local Transshipment nodes on Aquidneck Island plotted in QGIS. Highway
nodes displayed in yellow, local nodes displayed in purple.
Then, we use a process that is very similar to the one performed byRoutley (2020) to develop
a road network connecting transshipment nodes. The road network is first constructed by
plotting all transshipment nodes on top of an OpenStreetMap overlay within QGIS. The
data within this overlay is the real road network we obtain from the RIGIS website for
Aquidneck Island. Using a new linestring layer, we draw lines between each node using the
line snapping tool that closely mirrors the road network outlined on the OpenStreetMap
overlay. Once the road network is constructed, we create the first “from-to” arc layer using
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the QGIS “merge by location (summary)” tool where vertices are designated as minimum
and maximum. A second layer is generated in the same way, but with the vertices reversed.
These two layers are then merged to create one final “from-to” arc layer that contains
every arc required for the network. The road network of Aquidneck Island is displayed in
Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6. Road Network on Aquidneck Island. Road network overlayed on
city census boundaries.
Finally, we add real road data to the simplified road network developed in QGIS for road
capacity and speed. RIGIS has several data sets that inform the capacity of roads on
Aquidneck Island. We use this data to classify roads as arterial other, freeway, local,
major collector, minor arterial, minor collector, and dirt. The Rhode Island Department of
AdministrationDivision of Planning (2016) publishes data on non-congested road capacities
based on road type for the state of Rhode Island, and we utilize these capacities within our
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network. We combine this data to determine road capacity for our simplified network.
Speed limits within the network are also assigned based on road classification that is
obtained from a Rhode Island road network file published by the Rhode Island Department
of Transportation, and made available on the RIGIS website (Rhode Island Geographic
Information System (RIGIS) Data Distribution System 2017).
3.1.3 Evacuation Locations
The final data set we create is for the evacuation destinations—on-island shelters and off-
island routes—that at-risk populations will travel to if an evacuation is declared. We build
on evacuation locations already identified in existing plans and policies. In response to
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, the City of Newport and townships of Middletown
and Portsmouth produced and maintain hazard mitigation plans that list on-island shelter
locations for evacuations. We identify the geospatial locations of these shelters on Google
Maps and export them as a Keyhole Markup Language (KML) file. This KML file is then
read into GeoPandas where its geospatial data is further manipulated using Shapely and
then exported as a GeoJSON file. Using QGIS and the full CRS EPSG:4326, this GeoJSON
file is plotted on top of an OpenStreetMap base layer.
In addition to on-island shelters, we identify three evacuation locations off-island, which rep-
resent the main routes evacuating vehicles will use once they are outside Aquidneck Island
jurisdictions. We determine evacuation routes based on bridges originating on Aquidneck
Island and leading to Jamestown, Tiverton, and Bristol cities. Once an evacuee reaches any
of these locations, it is considered to have safely evacuated to the mainland. Figure 3.7
shows the resulting data set of on-island shelters and off-island evacuation locations.
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Figure 3.7. Evacuation Points and Shelter Locations. Off-Island Evacuation
points within the nearby mainland areas and inland shelters identified within
each municipalities hazard mitigation plan. Refer to Table 3.2 for specific
shelter names and locations.
We annotate this data set with information derived on the capacity for each shelter to
accept evacuees. Table 3.2 details the evacuee capacity and vehicle capacity for each of
the shelters. Shelter locations and evacuee capacities are based on an Army Corps of
Engineers NewEnglandHurricane Evacuation study that provided analysis on the capacities
of various identified American Red Cross shelters (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New
England District 2016). Most of these shelters are also identified in the hazard mitigation
plans for Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth. Vehicle capacity is determined using
the 2021 Codification of the General Ordinances of the City of Newport, Rhode Island
and calculations are extended to the cities of the Middletown and Portsmouth (Municipal
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Code Corporation 2021). Under the parking and loading standards contained within this
ordnance, all schools must have 1 parking spot per every 5 seats in a classroom. We obtain
the classroom ratios for each school as well as the number of teachers. An assumption
is made that each teacher is assigned to a classroom. The number of seats per class is
then multiplied by the number of teachers to determine the number of parking spots, a.k.a
vehicle capacity for each shelter. Resulting evacuee and vehicle capacities for each shelter
is presented in Table 3.2.
Overall, shelters are more constrained by parking than by capacity to shelter individuals.
For this reason, we use vehicle capacities to determine the total number of evacuees that
can be accepted at a shelter for all analyses.
Table 3.2. Shelter Capacity Analysis. Shelter capacity based on evacuee and
parking space availability. capacities not listed by the American Red Cross
are labeled as UNK. Off-island evacuation points have infinite capacity, listed
as INF. Adapted from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New England District
(2016).
City Shelter Designator Shelter Evacuee Vehicle
Type Name Capacity Capacity
Middletown Regional shelter1 Gaudet Middle School 1098 138
Middletown Local shelter2 Middletown High School 1000 123
Middletown Local shelter3 Forest Ave. Elementary UNK 73
Middletown Local shelter6 Aquidneck Elementary UNK 68
Newport Local shelter5 Florence Gray Center 0 60
Newport Local shelter8 Sullivan Elementary UNK 48
Portsmouth Local shelter4 Portsmouth High School 297 173
Portsmouth Local shelter7 Portsmouth Middle School 500 148
Bristol N/A evacuation1 Mt Hope Bridge INF INF
Jamestown N/A evacuation2 Newport Bridge INF INF
Tiverton N/A evacuation3 RT 24 Bridge INF INF
Given the new data sets curated for this study, we construct an network model built with the
open-source mathematical modeling program called Pyomo (Hart et al. 2011) in order to
analyze theAquidneck Island network. Pyomooffers an avenue to explore various constraints
in order to discover solutions that optimize our objective. Our formulated mathematical
model is detailed in the next section.
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3.2 Model Formulation
With the identified at-risk populations, road network, and evacuation locations, we use a
network optimization process to determine the best combinations of at-risk populations
and their destination assignment under various Aquidneck Island evacuation scenarios. For
this purpose, we develop a mathematical model that assigns evacuation routes to at-risk
populations while minimizing total evacuation travel time from at-risk population centers
to evacuation locations.
Indices and Sets
= ∈ # nodes (alias 8, 9)
B ∈ ( ⊂ # set of all source nodes
4 ∈  ⊂ # set of all evacuation destination nodes
(8, 9) ∈  ⊆ # × # arcs
g ∈ ) number of time steps [0,96]
(ḡ = total time period)
: ∈  B set of all evacuation paths starting at given source node B ∈ (
Data [units]
28 9g capacity of arc (8, 9) in time period g [vehicles per hour (VPH)]
38 9g distance of arc (8, 9) in time period g [miles]
d8 9g speed of arc (8, 9) in time period g [mph]
IB number of evacuating vehicles (i.e., supply) at source node B
{4 shelter capacity for evacuees at node e
_B4: = 1 if evacuation node 4 is included in path : for source node B, 0 otherwise [Binary]
|B8 9 : = 1 if arc 8, 9 is included in path : for source node B, 0 otherwise [Binary]
Decision Variables [units]
fB: = 1 if path : ∈  B chosen for source node B ∈ (; 0 otherwise [Binary]
VBg: flow rate of evacuating vehicles leaving node B in time period g along path : [VPH]
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fB: ∈ {0, 1} ∀B ∈ (, : ∈  B (3.8)
VBg ≥ 0 ∀B ∈ (, g ∈ ) (3.9)
`Bg ≥ 0 ∀B ∈ (, g ∈ ) (3.10)
Discussion
This model analyzes the flow of evacuating vehicles departing from source nodes located
within flooding regions toward inland shelters and off-island evacuation points. The model
assumes that evacueeswill depart from their source nodes at the earliest time period based on
available road capacity within their assigned route to their assigned destination. Additional
model assumptions are that each source node will be assigned one route and one destination
node. This assigned route and destination will be utilized by all of the population evacuees
throughout the entire duration of their trip. Evacuating populations as early as possible also
provides a best case total clearance time of all evacuating vehicles when road congestion
and flooding restricts usage of impacted road segments and inland shelters.
The objective function value (3.1) of the formulation minimizes the number of vehicles
waiting to depart, summed over each time period. This creates an incentive for vehicles
to leave as soon as possible. Constraint (3.2) enforces the capacity on each arc (i,j) given
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nonlinear congestion. Constraint (3.3) enforces that only one evacuation path is selected for
each source nodes. Constraint (3.4) enforces the total flow of vehicles out of source node
s along the selected evacuation path to be less than or equal to the number of evacuees
initially at that node. Constraint (3.5) enforces that at time period g = 0, the remaining
number of evacuees equals the initial number of evacuees at each source node s. Constraint
(3.6) calculates the number of evacuees remaining at source node s for all remaining time
periods g and is equal to the prior time period’s number of evacuees remaining minus the
number of vehicles that were able to evacuate during that prior time period g. Constraint
(3.7) enforces that the total number of evacuees from all source nodes that arrive at a
destination node 4 be less than or equal to its total shelter capacity. Stipulations (3.8), (3.9)
and (3.10) enforce the binary and non-negativity requirements for the decision variables.
3.3 Application of Our Network and Optimization Model
Summarizing the above data curation and model development integrates our methods for
evacuation analysis. We begin our network construction with 309 population centroids.
Using historical flooding data as well as current ADCIRC storm and sea level rise modeling
data, we identify only those at-risk populations that lay within these Aquidneck Island
flooding areas. The end result is 55 at-risk populations that serve as our origins. We also
have 8 inland shelters and three mainland evacuation points that serve as our destinations.
We apply in-land shelter capacity values that reflect individual upper limits on vehicle
capacity, as well as vehicle values for each at-risk population that reflect the total vehicle
count evacuating from each origin.
Additional assumptions are required for applying ourmodel.We assume that each household
in Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth will utilize two vehicles per household, and
those individuals on NAVSTA Newport and NUWC due to their transient nature will each
utilize their individual vehicle. We assume all evacuations take place by car, and multi-
modal evacuation is not analyzed. Additionally, We analyze multiple shortest paths for each
population node to each destination, and our model assigns all evacuees from each of the
at-risk population nodes to just one available path.
Given our data, model, and assumptions, we can test various disaster scenarios and evacua-
tion plans. Together, the results produce evacuating clearance times, destination assignment
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and vehicular flow. We develop three key scenarios demonstrating our methods in Chapter
4.
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We apply the model discussed in Chapter 3 to specific scenarios on Aquidneck Island in
order to analyze impacts of evacuation of at-risk populations under both clear day conditions
and flooding scenarios where specific road segments are impacted by worst case flooding
levels. We consider our previously identified at-risk populations, which consist of 55 origin
nodes representing local communities of houses. Each origin node must evacuate to one of
11 destinations, 8 of which are inland shelters and three represent the off-island evacuation
points that are all connected over a network that consists of 2744 road segments.
When considering the evacuation times presented within each scenario, as a point of refer-
ence Aquidneck Island is approximately 15 miles from its most southern point to its most
northern, and on average takes 30-40 minutes to traverse on a clear day without significant
traffic.
We consider the following scenarios for evacuation.
Scenario 1: Clear Day with Realistic Shelter Capacities
Scenario 2: Hurricane Henri (August 2021)
Scenario 3: Increased Capacities at All Shelters
For each of these scenarios, we address the following questions:
1. What is the total evacuation clearance time for the at-risk populations that residewithin
the city of Newport, each of the municipalities as well as the military installations?
2. To which on-island shelter or mainland evacuation point is each at-risk population
being evacuated?
3. What is the number of vehicles arriving at each mainland evacuation point during
each time period, as well as the total number of vehicles being directed off-island?
4. What is the vehicle flow into each of the shelters assigned over each time period, as
well as is the final capacity level reached at each shelter?
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4.1 Scenario 1: Clear day with Realistic Shelter Capacities
The first scenario we model takes place on a clear, “blue sky” day where road congestion
and destination capacity constraints are the only constraints that impact vehicle flow, path,
and destination selection.
According to the hazard mitigation plans for Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth, each
town or municipality has outlined designated shelters to which their at-risk populations
should evacuate in the event that evacuation is required due to a natural disaster (Nicholson
et al. 2017; Town of Middletown Local Hazard Mitigation Committee Town of Middletown
Planning Board 2014; Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency 2018). We apply the
realistic capacities of each of these inland shelters as well as allowing for traffic flow off-
island in order to determine the total clearance time to fully evacuate all at-risk populations
and the optimal destination assignments when a coordinated traffic routing algorithm is
applied.
Figure 4.1 shows the flow of vehicles exiting the city of Newport, municipalities of Mid-
dletown and Portsmouth, NAVSTA Newport, and NUWC during each time period. Each
of the lines represent the origin groupings. Total evacuation clearance time for all at-risk
populations is 15 hours. The city of Newport and NAVSTANewport take the longest amount
of time to fully evacuate all of their at-risk populations.
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Figure 4.1. Scenario 1—Vehicle Evacuation Flow Over Time. Flow of vehi-
cles evacuating from the city of Newport, municipalities of Middletown and
Portsmouth, NAVSTA Newport and NUWC. Total time period analyzed is
24 hours.
The model assigns evacuation destinations to each population in order to establish the most
optimal evacuation route and flow of vehicles based on the constraints of road and individual
capacity. These population-destination assignments can be seen in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2. Scenario 1—Shelter Assignment. Populations and their assigned
evacuation destinations from coordinated routing model. Each population is
color coded to match its assigned destination. Refer to Table 3.2 for specific
shelter names and locations.
Figure 4.3 shows the flow of vehicles entering each of the inland shelters as well as the
mainland evacuation points. Due to limited capacity within the inland shelters, many of the
shelters are full by approximately hour two. Additionally, the shelter capacity constraints
ultimately force a majority of evacuees off-island so that all of the at-risk populations can
completely evacuate to safety in the time period analyzed. Evacuation point 3, which is
the northeastern evacuation point to Bristol via RT 24, has the largest number of arriving
vehicles out of all destinations. This coincideswith very at-risk large populations inNorthern
Portsmouth that fall within FEMA identified hurricane evacuation zones whose shortest and
quickest path off-island is via evacuation point 3.
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Figure 4.3. Scenario 1—Vehicle Flow to Evacuation Locations Over Time.
Top: Map of vehicle flow off-island to the off-island evacuation points. Y
axis represents number of vehicles arriving off-island during each time period.
Bottom: Flow of vehicles into each inland shelter. Y axis represents the %
filled to capacity as vehicles arrive. Total time period analyzed is 24 hours.
Refer to Table 3.2 for specific shelter names and locations.
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4.2 Scenario 2: Hurricane Henri
During the course of this thesis,HurricaneHenri, whichweakened froma hurricane category
1 to a tropical storm, made landfall in Westerly, Rhode Island. On 22 August 2021, this slow
moving storm brought wind speeds of 70mph, heavy rains and heavy inland and coastal
flooding. With an anticipated landfall occurring west of Aquidneck Island, on the evening
of 20 August, we began coordination with NAVSTANewport emergency planners. Within a
few hours, we identified their concerns, ran our model and prepared a brief for the NAVSTA
Newport base installation commander. This brief was presented on Saturday morning the
21st of August to all pertinent stakeholders, the day prior to Hurricane Henri making
landfall. In less than 48 hours, we produced results from a critical evacuation scenario and
provided information that assisted in NAVSTA Newport’s time critical evacuation planning
process.
Despite the projected weakening of this storm, NAVSTA Newport requested information
regarding evacuation clearance times for their resident population if an evacuation order
was implemented. After discussion with the installation’s emergency planners, we were
requested to model this evacuation with the following constraints: evacuation to the west
across the Newport Bridge was prohibited due to the projected storm track, and all NAVSTA
Newport personnel had to evacuate off-island. Additionally, NUWC employs a large number
of civilian employees, and because Hurricane Henri was making landfall over the weekend,
a majority of these employees were not at work during this time period. Therefore, we
adjusted the number of vehicles evacuating NUWC in Scenario 3 to better represent only
the essential military personnel that would be at NUWC if the evacuation order was given.
Even though the local shelters were available, local emergency planners from Newport,
Middletown, and Portsmouth in the past have requested that all military personnel who
are evacuating leave Aquidneck Island in order to allow for the local population to use the
inland shelters. Another considering factor in this decision is that the Navy pays for the
lodging of all personnel required to evacuate, while many in the civilian population require
the ability to shelter in locations free of charge.
This Hurricane Henri scenario is analyzed using the coordinated algorithm. We apply the
planning requirements fromNAVSTANewport and assume that all of the at-risk populations
located on Aquidneck Island would also be ordered to evacuate at the same time. Total
clearance time for all at-risk populations on Aquidneck Island is found to take 30 hours.
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However, the populations located on NAVSTANewport are able to completely evacuate off-
island within 19 hours using northern evacuation routes toward mainland cities of Tiverton
and Bristol. The flow of vehicles leaving the city of Newport, municipalities of Middletown
and Portsmouth as well as the military installations can be seen in Figure 4.4. With the
exception of Newport’s at-risk populations, all other locations are able to evacuate within
approximately five hours.
Figure 4.4. Scenario 2—Vehicle Evacuation Flow Over Time. Flow of vehicles
out of the city of Newport, the municipalities of Middletown and Portsmouth,
as well as NAVSTA Newport and NUWC during each time period during
Hurricane Henri scenario. Total time period analyzed was 24 hours.
Closing of one of the major bridges in Newport and prohibiting evacuation westward is
more restrictive than Scenario 1. This restriction causes a large impact on evacuation travel
times as road capacities cannot handle the additional flow. The result is that full evacuation
of all at-risk populations is not possible within a 24-hr period, particularly for large Newport
populations that reside in the southern portion of Aquidneck Island. These evacuees would,
if allowed, evacuate much quicker westward over the Newport Bridge versus having to
61
traverse the entire Aquidneck Island in order to use the two northern bridges to reach the
mainland.
In Scenario 2, the model assigns new evacuation destinations to each population in order to
establish the most optimal evacuation route and flow of vehicles. New routing is driven by
the additional constraints of no evacuation westward and all NAVSTA Newport personnel
being required to evacuate off-island. The population-destination assignments can be seen
in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5. Scenario 2—Shelter Assignment. Populations and their assigned
evacuation destinations from coordinated routing model within the Hurri-
cane Henri scenario. Each population is color coded to match its assigned
destination. Refer to Table 3.2 for specific shelter names and locations.
Due to the limited capacities of the inland shelters, they are all at their maximum limit
by approximately hour ten, In fact with the exception of shelter one and shelter seven, all
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other inland shelters are full by approximately hour two of the evacuation. Additionally, a
majority of the evacuation population are still routed off-island. The flow into the inland
shelters as well as the off-island evacuation points can be seen in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6. Scenario 2—Vehicle Flow to Evacuation Locations Over Time.
Top: Map of vehicle flow off-island to the off-island evacuation points. Y
axis represents number of vehicles arriving off-island during each time period.
Bottom: Flow of vehicles into each inland shelter. Y axis represents the %
filled to capacity as vehicles arrive. Total time period analyzed was 24 hours.
Refer to Table 3.2 for specific shelter names and locations.
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4.3 Scenario 3: Increased Capacities at All Shelters
As demonstrated in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, the total vehicular capacity at inland shelters is
far less than the anticipated number of evacuating vehicles. This is why in Scenarios 1 &
2, a majority of the at-risk population is routed off-island. In total, inland shelters can only
support approximately 1/6 of those evacuees. Scenario 3 is developed to test the benefits
of additional shelter capacity on island. Specifically, we test optimal evacuation given an
increased capacity for each shelter as 8000 vehicles. We also include off-island evacuation
in all three directions. This scenario’s parameters are the least restrictive, and assume that if
shelter capacity is not a constraint, then evacuees will most likely choose the closest shelter
available.
For Scenario 3, total evacuation clearance time is again 15 hours. Vehicle flow can be seen
in Figure 4.7. Scenario 3 vehicle flow is similar to what was seen in Scenario 1, but with a
noticeable difference in evacuation clearance for some populations. Specifically, a majority
of Newport’s at-risk populations reach shelter destinations by hour five of evacuation.
This vehicle flow makes sense because out of the eight inland shelters, six of them are
situated either within the city of Newport, or on the border between between Newport
and Middletown. Thus, increased shelter capacity has the greatest impact on Newport
communities.
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Figure 4.7. Scenario 3—Vehicle Evacuation Flow Over Time. Flow of vehicles
out of the city of Newport, the municipalities of Middletown and Portsmouth,
as well as NAVSTA Newport and NUWC during each time period. Total time
period analyzed is 24 hours.
In Scenario 3, the model assigns new evacuation destinations to each population in order
to establish the most optimal evacuation route and flow of vehicles based on road capac-
ity constraints only. This is a relaxation of Scenario 1. Resulting population-destination
assignments can be seen in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8. Scenario 3—Shelter Assignment. Populations and their assigned
evacuation destinations from coordinated routing model within the increased
shelter capacity scenario. Each population is color coded to match its as-
signed destination. Refer to Table 3.2 for specific shelter names and locations.
Figure 4.9 details the vehicle flow into each of the shelters as well as off-island. The top
figure details the number of vehicles that are flowing off-island, while the bottom figure
gives insight into how much of the shelter’s capacity is being consumed as the time periods
progress. In Scenario 3, because the shelter capacities have all been increased to 8000, each
shelter has a large amount of capacity remaining at the end of the evacuation period. Shelters
two, six, seven and eight receive all of their evacuees by hour 5, while the remaining four
shelters continue to receive evacuees until hour 13. Off-island vehicle flow continues until
hour 15. Interestingly, when all three off-island evacuation points are available, the optimal
choices made by the model are to send evacuees westward across the Newport Bridge
and northeast across RT 24 into Tiverton. The largest percentage of at-risk populations
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on Aquidneck Island resides very near to these two off-island exit points. This scenario
clearly shows that available road capacity and short distance to the mainland allow for the
evacuation of large amounts of people in a short time.
Figure 4.9. Scenario 3—Vehicle Flow To Evacuation Locations Over Time.
Top: Vehicle flow off-island to the off-island evacuation points during each
time period. Bottom: Flow of vehicles into each on-island shelter during each
time period. When normalized shelter utilization = 1, then the number of
vehicles arriving at the shelter = the true shelter capacity. Utilization > 1
implies the arrival of more vehicles than true capacity. For example, after
evacuation, shelter 7 is utilized near its true capacity (utilization ∼ 1),
where shelter 5 is utilized by 10.5 times more vehicles than its true capacity.
Total time period analyzed is 24 hours. Refer to Table 3.2 for specific shelter
names and locations.
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4.4 Scenario Comparison and Discussion
The three scenarios above highlight distinctly different environments for potential evacuation
from Aquidneck Island.
Evacuation on a clear, blue sky day (Scenario 1) provides the baseline best case scenario
of evacuation of all at-risk populations according to the current plans developed by the
city of Newport, Middletown, and Portsmouth. Additionally, this scenario also includes
the coordination required for evacuation of NAVSTA Newport and her tenant commands,
which to date is not something that has been included in the city of Newport, Middletown,
or Portsmouth’s planning process. In other words, this this the first evacuation plan for
Aquidneck Island that optimally routes both civilian and military evacuees.
Consideration of Hurricane Henri (Scenario 2) allows us to model a realistic evacuation
scenario with constraints that would be imposed in the event of an actual disaster. Due to
Hurricane Henri’s storm track, the westward evacuation route was deemed to be dangerous
and therefore we model that evacuation point being restricted from any use. We also learned
from the Emergency Management Officer for NAVSTA Newport that, in the event of an
evacuation order, local emergency planners request that all military personnel leave the
island and reserve shelter space for the local civilian populations. In order to fully model
the constraints within this scenario, we slightly modify our model to ensure that during the
optimization, the solver does not assign any local shelters as destinations for any military
personnel.
We consider Scenario 3 to provide insight into the most effective locations for a potential
expansion in shelter capacity. Shelter capacity expansion could be adding increased space
to the shelters already being utilized, or the designation of more shelters in the same
generalized area.
The total clearance times for all civilian and military communities differ across scenarios.
In Scenario 1, when evacuating conditions are perfect and all off-island evacuation routes
are available, as well as the only constraints restricting timely traffic flow are available road
and shelter capacity, it takes 15 hours for the entire island to evacuate. In Scenario 2, when
additional constraints are applied, we observe that evacuation clearance time for NAVSTA
Newport increases by 21%, going from 15 hours to 19 hours. Additionally, total island
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clearance time goes from 15 hours to 30 hours, an increase of 50%. In Scenario 3, even with
the increase in shelter capacity, total evacuation time is the original baseline evacuation
time seen in Scenario 1, which is 15 hours.
Each scenario imposed specific constraints that impact the clearance time for sub-
populations in the city of Newport, the municipalities of Middletown and Portsmouth,
as well as NAVSTA Newport and NUWC. The clearance times for each of these locations
is listed in Table 4.1. Portsmouth is the one location whose clearance time was unchanged
during each scenario, which can be attributed to the fact that there are two main evacu-
ation points, one northeast and one northwest that are very close and easily accessible to
Portsmouth’s at-risk populations. This accessibility allows them a quicker evacuation to the
mainland, even under the same restrictive conditions that impact the other locations. The
city of Newport experiences the biggest impact under Scenario 2 with the closing of the
Newport Bridge combined with the limited capacity of the nearby shelters. These conditions
force their large at-risk populations to have to compete with traffic flow from all of the other
evacuation locations, as they traverse the entire island to the two northern exits.
Table 4.1. City of Newport, the Municipalities of Middletown and
Portsmouth, NAVSTA Newport and NUWC Evacuation Clearance Time Sce-
nario Comparison in hours.
Location Scenario Scenario Scenario
1 2 3
NAVSTA Newport 15 19 15
NUWC 5 2 4
City of Newport 15 30 14
Middletown 4 10 5
Portsmouth 5 5 5
The constraints of road capacity, available shelter capacity, and blockage of certain access
points also impacts the number of vehicles chosen to evacuate off-island in each scenario.
The number of evacuees leaving the island under these various constraints is listed in
Table 4.2.
In Scenario 1, 90% of the population is routed off-island, while in Scenario 2, when the
military population is required to leave the island, only 80% of the total population is
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Table 4.2. Vehicle Flow Off-Island Scenario Comparison. For reference, total
number of evacuees is 6923 for Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. Total number of
evacuees for Scenario 2 is reduced to 6695 because of reduction in number
of evacuees located on NUWC within this scenario. Refer to Table 3.2 for
specific evacuation locations.
Evacuation Scenario Scenario Scenario
location 1 2 3
Evacuation1 1001 1713 205
Evacuation2 2331 N/A 1547
Evacuation3 2932 3963 1561
Totals 6264/6923 5675/6695 3313/6923
routed off-island, which implies that in Scenario 1, large portions of NAVSTA Newport
personnel were being evacuated to nearby shelters in the city of Newport, which required
larger portions of the local population to have to leave the island. In Scenario 3 where shelter
capacity constraints are relaxed, only 47% of at-risk populations are routed off-island, which
implies that if the local shelters had the available capacity, an optimal solution is that shelters
across the island become primary evacuation points for many of the at-risk populations vice
off-island evacuation.
Another area of analysis is the vehicle flow towards inland shelters and the capacity to
which they are utilized. This information is listed in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Due to
limited capacity within each shelter, a majority of all shelters fill within the first few hours
in each evacuation scenario. In Scenario 1, shelter 2 (Middletown High School) remains
open the longest receiving evacuees until hour 14 of the evacuation. This location also
fills to approximately 94% of its available capacity in Scenario 1. In Scenario 2, shelter
7 (Portsmouth Middle School) remains open the longest receiving evacuees until hour 9,
however even by remaining open the longest it ultimately only fills to approximately 73% of
its available capacity. In Scenario 3 with the increased capacity of the inland shelters, more
shelters remain open longer. Interestingly in Scenario 3, shelter 3 (Forest Ave. Elementary)
is not even utilized, while in Scenarios 1 and 2 it is filled to 85% and 93% of its capacity.
With expanded capacity capabilities provided in Scenario 3, the shelter that experiences
the largest increase in evacuees is shelter 5 (Florence Grey shelter), located within the
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city of Newport, which is the city on Aquidneck Island that has the largest number of
at-risk populations that need to be evacuated. It is interesting that shelter 4 (Portsmouth
High School) does see a large increase in capacity, but if you refer back to Figure 4.8, the
increased number of evacuees to that shelter are from outside Portsmouth. This implies
that even with the increased shelter capacity at two nearby shelters, the optimal solution for
evacuation for Portsmouth at-risk populations is to still be routed off-island.
Table 4.3. On-Island Shelter Fill Time Scenario Comparison in hours. Refer
to Table 3.2 for specific on-island shelter names and locations.
Shelter Scenario Scenario Scenario
location 1 2 3
Shelter1 4 6 4
Shelter2 14 2 13
Shelter3 4 1 0
Shelter4 2 2 13
Shelter5 2 1 14
Shelter6 1 1 5
Shelter7 3 9 2
Shelter8 9 1 3
Table 4.4. On-Island Shelter Capacity Scenario Comparison in %. Refer to
Table 3.2 for specific shelter names and locations.
Shelter Scenario Scenario Scenario
location 1 2 3
Shelter1 0.85 0.93 2.52
Shelter2 0.94 0.86 4.59
Shelter3 0.85 0.93 0.00
Shelter4 0.79 0.84 6.83
Shelter5 0.80 0.80 10.06
Shelter6 0.91 0.91 6.26
Shelter7 0.94 0.73 1.12
Shelter8 0.83 0.63 7.91
The results across all three scenarios outline the current applicability of our model and its
capability to perform under a range of constraints. The use of our optimization model is a
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tool for analysis that provides insights into possible evacuation plans. Optimization models
like it are not considered in current evacuation practices and hazard mitigation plans in
many municipalities.
While our model supports optimal evacuation routing and minimizes evacuation time, the
results may be difficult to implement. For example, across all three scenarios, our model
assigns co-located or nearby communities to different shelters or off-island evacuation loca-
tions. This means nearby houses may need to travel to entirely different parts of Aquidneck
Island for optimal evacuation. Such nuance is hard to implement in practice as municipali-
ties generally only get to choose "go" or "no-go" evacuation decisions and may have limited
capacity to direct traffic on a house-by-house basis.
There is also the inherent factor of human decision making that can’t be controlled. Even
if told where to go, how to get there and when to leave, the final decision resides with
the evacuee. Ultimately, some evacuation plans might be easy for emergency planners to
implement, but are overall inefficient when it comes to clearance time. Or conversely,
evacuation plans that produce optimal clearance times, may be to difficult to implement in
practice.
Thus, this thesis is only a starting point for a broader discussion with Aquidneck Island’s
emergency managers and planners to answer the questions: what is possible for evacuation,
and how long will it take? Answering these questions requires additional information
beyond the optimization model. Thus, this work is also supporting a tabletop exercise to
be conducted by Dr. Austin Becker’s team to identify real decision-making needs. This




This chapter concludes with a brief summary of our work as well as current limitations and
potential future work.
5.1 Summary
In this thesis, we construct a data set of nodes including at-risk populations (origins) and
evacuation points (destinations), a road network with real capacities and travel times, and
an optimization model for analysis. We implement our new data and model to measure
evacuation clearance times for individual at-risk populations as well total island clearance
times.Weuse our data andmethods to determine optimal evacuation in several key scenarios,
including a real evacuation plan for a recent storm. Together, our approach proved capable
of analyzing traffic flow of evacuating vehicles under a variety of contexts, including "clear
sky" days and situations with reduced capacities imposed by a natural disaster.
We provide insight into how the current hazard mitigation plans can be modified to ensure a
more successful evacuation when cross city/municipality and NAVSTA Newport coordina-
tion is required. Furthermore, we identify critical infrastructure that has direct impacts on
clearance times, of which includes the Newport Bridge and the individual shelter capacities
located on-island.
Ultimately, we suggest that the current road network of Aquidneck Island is in fact able to
support full evacuation of the currently identified at-risk populations within varying time
frames. The current limitations to evacuations seems to not come from capacity constraints
of the roads themselves, but the limited number of vehicle capacity available at each of the
shelters on-island.
5.2 Limitations
Our analysis relies on a number of assumptions, whose validity would impact the applica-
bility of our results. We impose a requirement that all evacuating vehicles from a single
73
at-risk population are assigned the same evacuation destination and travel route (i.e., choice
of roads used to reach the destination). Additionally, vehicles remain on this assigned path
for the entire evacuation, this means that we do not account for blockages that might occur
along this path that could result in the requirement to reroute traffic. Destination selection
is also only assigned to a specific population if it has the capacity to accept all of the
population’s evacuees. In other words, we do not model the splitting of an at-risk population
to multiple destinations. Additionally, we make an assumption that each household will be
evacuating using two cars with the exception of NAVSTANewport and NUWCwhere every
evacuee uses their own personal vehicle. In reality, many households might use more or
less than what we have approximated, which would impact road capacity levels during each
time period and clearance times.
Within this thesis, we use the ADCIRCmodel’s flooding and storm surge inundation data to
identify the 55 at-risk populations, and we model the restricted use of the Newport Bridge in
Scenario 2 as though flooding and high winds prevent evacuation along that route. However,
even though the pre-processing of the data is constructed in such a way to calculate changes
in road capacity and speed along specific arcs that could be impacted by road flooding, we
do not incorporate time-phased flooding constraints within the current analysis.
Although storm surge inundation and road flooding is a severe consequence of hurricanes,
these storms tend to also produce high winds that impact at-risk communities that reside
both along the coast as well as inland. These high winds have the potential to restrict the
use of bridges hours before any flooding occurs. The impacts of high wind speeds on the
three mainland evacuation points leaving from Aquidneck Island, which all happen to be
via the use of a bridge, is not considered in this study.
When analyzing vehicle flow from each at-risk population over each of the time epochs,
there are periods of time where flow of vehicles exiting an at-risk population is paused or
delayed in travel from the start of the evacuation. The current objective function within
our model does seek to minimize the number of vehicles waiting to depart summed over
each time period, but a future modification of this objective function that applies a stronger
penalty for delay in vehicle flow might produce even quicker evacuation clearance times.
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5.3 Future Work
The next phase of this work should be to incorporate different traffic conditions, such as car
accidents and power outages. Integration of specific infrastructure systems such as power
and water, will allow for a deeper analysis into the cascading impacts that occur due to the
interdependencies between these systems. Both of these systems are highly impacted by
natural disasters, causing major disruptive events like power outages at intersections and
stormwater inundation to sewer andwater drainage systems, leading to additional dangerous
overflow onto the roads.
We conduct evacuation analysis under an implied assumption that all populations are evac-
uating using their own personal vehicles. There are opportunities to expand our model to
better reflect communities that rely more on multi-modal forms of transportation such as
buses, street cars, or the subway.
The road network and node data set conducted for the analysis on Aquidneck Island can
easily be reconstructed for other isolated and vulnerable locations important to the United
States Navy such as Guam, Hawaii, Norfolk, and San Diego.
We recommend that these areas should be further researched and incorporated within
our current model, and that the results are built upon to help inform emergency planners
in the creation of successful, integrated, time-phased, and feasible hazard mitigation and
evacuation plans for their communities.
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